�鶹������ý

The dynamics surrounding external intervention in Iraq offer an important window into the future of proxy competition. Many of the same dynamics that fed external intervention in Iraq—faltering state institutions, periods of high flux and transition, and a proliferation of potential proxies—have incentivized proxy dynamics in states across the Middle East and its periphery.¹ In the words of International Crisis Group CEO Robert Malley, this recipe of “weak states cohabiting with powerful non-state actors” in a period of multiple transitions have created “the ideal circumstances for external interference.”² Scholar Seyom Brown argues that factors like the “relative rise in power of the non-state actors, and the volatility of their relationships, as well as the shifting relationships between state actors”—all of which have been on display in Iraq—are those that have made the Middle East a “cauldron” of proxy warfare.³

The proxy dynamics in countries like Yemen, Syria, and Libya also feature some of the same elements of sub-state competition, dominant non-state or hybrid actors, and local-to-regional escalatory patterns that have complicated both proxy intervention and state control in Iraq. Malley has argued that a number of highly polarized and interconnected fault lines cut across local to regional dynamics in the Middle East.⁴ In a description that could apply to Iraqi conflicts from Tal Afar to Tuz Khurmatu, Malley notes that in such environments “local struggles quickly take on regional significance—and thus attract weapons, money, and political support from the outside.”⁵ Such dynamics can generate more external intervention, while also making it more difficult to contain the consequences of any incident or clash. As Malley writes, “because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility.”⁶

The rise of powerful non-state actors, many of whom assume the formal or de facto authority of the state, and the fluid state to non-state lines this generates is a trend across the broader region.⁷ These powerful non-state or hybrid actors—to include the Hashd in Iraq, the PKK in Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or any number of powerful Libyan militia groups—continue to seek the support of external backers, but also have significant independence and autonomy, and wield their own coercive power.⁸ Like the Hashd and Kurdish forces discussed above, many of these powerful hybrid or non-state actors may act as both proxies and patrons in these conflicts. They may run their own sub-state proxies, often with greater control and perspicacity than their foreign patrons.⁹

This poses challenges to external states’ strategies of control, and also can exacerbate the tendency for proxy dynamics to spark greater conflict and volatility. As Malley writes, “The fact that nonstate actors operate as both proxies and independent players makes it hard to establish accountability for violence or deter it in the first place.” The potential for this type of escalation has been on clear display in the responses to Iran’s so-called proxies in both Iraq and Yemen. The defensive posturing or personal vendettas of one paranoid Shi’a militia commander or of the Houthi regime can easily spark a larger regional or global standoff.¹⁰

What do these findings suggest for the future of proxy warfare, in Iraq, in the Middle East, and more broadly? First, we should assume that external intervention will continue to play a strong role in domestic politics, and that Iraq will continue to be a situs for regional and international actors’ proxy competition with each other. This might sometimes manifest in clear cut proxy relationships, with a strong degree of hierarchical control and a heavy focus on the patron state’s interests and objectives, but more often it will result in relationships with lesser control and a greater deal of proxy intervention in the political and economic domains. This might include the sort of political surrogates that the United States has supported in Iraq, the more flexible and arms-length relationships that Iran maintains with non-Shi’a brokers across Iraq’s political spectrum, as well as more general soft-power projection and competition.¹¹ Even if they do not involve "hard proxies," such non-proxy relationships can play an equally important role in generating regional and international tensions, and in sparking tit-for-tat posturing and proxy alliances.¹²

Clear cut surrogate forces and relationships and direct proxy competition or conflict is more likely to take place in the sub-state arena, with the proxy patrons as likely (if not more likely) to be Iraqi domestic stakeholders as non-Iraqi patrons. The greater influence of strong sub-state or hybrid forces, the high degree of fluidity and flux, and the greater attention given to internal balancing will continue to make external intervention more challenging to control. Given this, the best external strategy may be one that embraces lesser control and greater flexibility, to better take advantage of potential moments of convergence, while taking on the least risk of blowback.

The major implication for the United States is a recognition of the deep complexity of the environment, which makes blanket policies unlikely to be effective. The intricate interplay of internal and external (state and sub-state) interests will require an equally nuanced approach on the part of the U.S. government, both with regard to the Iraqi actors or forces it would like to influence and those aligned with rival states. While external influences will be present across every Iraqi relationship and political contest, not every provocation or aggressive action is driven from the outside. Placing a proxy lens on these largely domestically driven competitions runs the risk of misattributing specific threats, and of overall increasing the conflict-prone nature of the system.