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Over the course of 2019 and into 2020, the United States and Iran came perilously close to full out war, with increasing economic and political tensions, escalating threat postures, and a series of tit-for-tat proxy attacks fueling a geopolitical standoff. Iraq found itself at the center of this emerging proxy war, with Iraqi forces, militia groups, and Iraqi territory both the target and provocation for escalating U.S.-Iranian tensions. Iraq has frequently been the situs for such international and regional competition—so much so that it has been framed as a “playground” for regional players and as a country “caught between two giants [the U.S. and Iran].”¹

However, while external intervention has long been an important dynamic in Iraq, the assumption that domestic events are driven primarily by proxy meddling can overstate the degree of external influence and control, and underestimate the role of Iraqi actors and interests. If given too wide a breadth, this narrative of proxy war can lead to serious misinterpretation and conflict escalation in an already volatile environment.

This report draws upon extensive research and interviews conducted in Iraq and Washington, D.C.,² to illustrate changing proxy dynamics in Iraq and their implications for the larger U.S.-Iranian tensions. To do so, it examines the U.S. and Iranian partnerships in Iraq that are most frequently framed as proxy relationships, and how they have been affected by the political and conflict dynamics that emerged in Iraq after the 2014 ISIS crisis. While the research found ample evidence of external influence, external machinations were not always the best explanation for how domestic stand-offs, clashes, or incidents emerged or were resolved. Instead, a lens of “convergence of interests” between Iraqi actors and their external partners better explains external influence in Iraq than the framework of proxy manipulation.

Key Findings:

• The post-2014 environment incentivized proxy intervention, but also made it more difficult to manage. The 2014 ISIS crisis and its fallout sparked mass mobilization and the proliferation of armed groups, creating a range of potential proxies and partners. However, the multiplicity of armed actors, and the complex and constantly fluctuating relationships between them, made proxy partnerships more unreliable and more difficult to predict and control.
• Such dynamics set off a heated, zero-sum domestic competition between Iraqi parties and forces that dominated Iraqi stakeholders’ interactions and calculations, above those of external interests. For Iraqi stakeholders, the need to focus on immediate short-term gains or political or group survival tended to crowd out attention to external interests.
• The clearest manifestations of proxy competition and proxy relationships occur at the sub-state level. Larger Iraqi and Kurdish stakeholders cultivated subsidiary relationships and partnerships with smaller, localized groups and forces, and used them to advance their interests domestically, a form of sub-state proxy warfare. Such sub-state proxy relationships were intermixed with external support, creating a layered proxy competition that further complicated external control.
• External interests are not absent, but nor are they the driver behind most expansive or aggressive moves by Iraqi forces and actors. Even those groups at the center of the proxy debate — some of the pro-Iran forces within the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) — are mostly driven by their own interests, threat perceptions, and ideologies. Even if some PMF behavior can be linked to Iran, a greater share of their activities are not. Assuming that any given hostile act or threat by a PMF group has been directed by Iran can be a dangerous over-assumption.
• Given the significant Iraqi interests at play, a better way to explain external influence on Iraqi dynamics is as the result of a “convergence of interests” between domestic and external parties. This convergence of interests theory not only explains the relationship between more steadfast partners and ideological soulmates, like the Shi’a PMF and Iran, or even the United States and the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, but also the variations in less fixed relationships, as with the Kurdish parties or the Iraqi government.
• These dynamics are not limited to Iraq, but may represent a new genre of proxy warfare. Similar trends in other parts of the Middle East suggest the future of proxy warfare may be more likely to manifest in the more ambiguous, and sub-state-dominated competition in Iraq than the modes of proxy warfare that have gone before it. These trends suggest that while full control and cultivation of ‘hard proxies’ may not be realistic, it may also not be necessary. A more nuanced approach, more focused on long-term partner cultivation and attentive to local-to-regional risk factors and side effects, may be a better strategy for engagement in the future.

In January 2020, the long-simmering proxy war between the United States and Iran exploded into direct engagement, verging on open war.¹ A U.S. drone strike killed the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)'s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, while he was travelling from Baghdad airport in Iraq.² For decades, Soleimani was the mastermind behind Iran’s network of militias and proxy allies across the region and the architect of Iranian campaigns in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, among others.³

Soleimani’s killing was precipitated by a year of escalating political and security tensions between the United States and Iran, and very real and credible threats and attacks by both sides. But it also appeared to be triggered by the way that proxy threats and relationships are interpreted in Iraq, often mistakenly so. Without question, proxy competition is a very real dynamic in Iraq—external intervention has long shaped Iraq’s domestic relations and the potential for proxy manipulation is arguably greater than it ever has been before. However, the narrative of proxy warfare tends to overstate external puppeteering as the driver of political and conflict dynamics in Iraq, and understates the role of Iraqi actors’ agency and interests. This too often results in misattribution and misinterpretation of threats, in ways that can escalate an already volatile situation, as with Soleimani’s killing.

This report, part of �鶹������ý and the Arizona State University Center on the Future of War series on the future of proxy warfare, will examine the nature of proxy competition in Iraq, and its influence on Iraqi-domestic political and security dynamics. The Iraqi case illustrates how deeply enmeshed regional and international agendas and conflicts are in even very localized conflicts and political stand-offs in Iraq; however, it also helps illustrate the limitations of external intervention and external states’ ability to exert proxy control.

The post-2014 dynamics in Iraq incentivized proxy intervention but they also made it more difficult to manage. A multiplicity of armed actors, complex and constantly fluctuating relationships between them, and a domestically driven zero-sum competition challenged external actors’ ability to develop consolidated relationships of control. Within this environment, proxy competition has been much more regularly driven and exercised by Iraqi actors themselves, in relationships that might be described as part of a sub-state proxy competition.

These dynamics suggest a need to rethink standard assumptions about proxy warfare, both within Iraq and in other potential proxy war arenas. Proxy competition is likely to emerge in environments like those in Iraq, with complex, multi-polar, and interconnected internal political dynamics. In such environments, external actors can play a big role, but will struggle to fully control domestic sub parties and contests. Rather than proxy manipulation, an analytical framework that understands external influence as the product of a convergence of interests between external and internal actors, may be more accurate, and less likely to lead to misattribution and escalation.

This report is divided into five sections including this introduction. The second section provides background on the history of external intervention and proxy competition in Iraq. The third section examines the particular dynamics that emerged in the wake of the crisis of 2014. The fourth section will then use a discussion of the relationship between the United States and its partners, and then by Iran and its partners, to illustrate some of the limitations of proxy intervention in the current environment. The fifth and concluding section examines the relevance of these findings for the broader Middle East and the future of proxy warfare.

External intervention has long been a critical dynamic in Iraq, with indirect or proxy intervention influencing Iraq’s internal and external relations since the creation of the Iraqi state. Historical or current proxy ‘patrons’ in Iraq have included the United States, Iran, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia, as well as other Gulf countries.¹ Many of the Iraqi forces or actors that are framed as proxies of external powers emerged out of past cycles of external intervention. Since the 1960s, the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have been willing to work with both Iran and the United States in their efforts to undermine the government in Baghdad—a pattern that continues to the present.² During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Iran and Iraq cultivated proxy forces against each other, including Iran’s support to the then-exiled Iraqi Shi’a group, the Badr Brigades, now known as the Badr Organization and one of the most significant political forces and potential proxies in Iraq.³

The proxies and relationships of influence that emerged after the 2003 U.S. invasion are even more salient for current political dynamics. After the U.S. invasion, Iran supported a number of Shi’a parties and militia groups in Iraq,⁴ including the Badr Organization, the Mahdi Army under Moqtada al-Sadr,⁵ Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), or “League of the Righteous,”⁶ and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH).⁷ These groups waged a bloody campaign against U.S. forces in Iraq, and both then and now, have been at the center of allegations of proxy warfare.⁸

Beyond backing Shi’a militia groups, Iran also invested heavily in developing a network of political proxies and partners, supporting Shi’a political parties and leaders to advance to senior positions in the Iraqi government.⁹ It was the strategy of both Iran and the United States after 2003 to turn the re-emerging Iraqi institutions, particularly the security apparatus, to their side.¹⁰ In the initial period following the U.S. invasion, the United States was considered to be strongly in control of the Ministry of Defense, the intelligence service, and their associated security forces, while from 2005, pro-Iran politicians and parties (notably Badr and its political affiliates) gained and held control of the Ministry of Interior (MoI).¹¹ Members of the Shi’a militia forces noted above then intermingled with and became virtually indistinguishable from MoI-controlled Iraqi security forces.¹²

Pro-Iran parties and militias became even more ascendant under Nouri al-Maliki’s second term (2010 to 2014). Maliki was initially selected with full U.S. buy-in—even characterized as a U.S. proxy by some.¹³ But it was Iranian pressure and backroom deals that enabled him to succeed to his second term after his coalition did not win enough votes in the 2010 parliamentary elections.¹⁴ After that point, he relied even more strongly on pro-Iranian militias and Shi’a political networks to maintain his hold on power.¹⁵

The United States of course also built its own partners and surrogate forces in the post-2003 period, which have their own legacy effects for current proxy dynamics. Much of the U.S. influence over Iraqi security and political institutions, which it rebuilt from 2003 on, was systematically eroded under Maliki’s second term, and especially after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.¹⁶ However, the United States has maintained significant influence with the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), the elite security forces that U.S. Special Forces have closely mentored for a decade and a half.¹⁷ The U.S. invasion and rebuilding of the Iraqi state also enabled much greater autonomy and political weight for the Kurds, who still retain a special relationship with the United States and other Western states.¹⁸ From 2006 to 2008, the United States was the architect behind the Sunni sahwa (“Awakening”) or Sons of Iraq initiative, with nearly 100,000 predominantly Sunni tribal fighters on the U.S. payroll by 2008.¹⁹ These past associations have created a lingering perception of the Kurds and Sunnis as U.S. proxies within Iraq (a claim that will be analyzed in subsequent sections).

Regional actors like Turkey and Saudi Arabia also cultivated partners in Iraq in the post-2003 period, particularly in the lead-up to the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.²⁰ Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries provided intermittent funding to some Sunni Arab leaders,²¹ while Turkey developed warmer relations and economic ties with the KDP.²² These more limited strategies of influence never really achieved the degree of control or coercion that Iran enjoyed with its Iraqi partners. Nonetheless, they help illustrate the range of regional proxy intervention in Iraq and the way that particular geographic areas within Iraq can feature as a “playground” for competition between regional powers.²³

Nearly all of these same domestic forces and external relationships of influence continue to exist, and to raise allegations of proxy warfare. In particular, the Iraqi Shi’a militias that Iran had supported for more than a decade were at the center of escalating tensions and tit-for-tat attacks or threats between the United States and Iran over the course of 2018 and 2019.²⁴ A series of attacks allegedly by and against Kata’ib Hezbollah in December 2019 were the immediate precursor²⁵ to the targeting of Soleimani, as well as of the Iraqi military leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was travelling with Soleimani and killed in the same drone strike.²⁶ The founder of Kata’ib Hezbollah, al-Muhandis, had been designated as a U.S. global terrorist since 2009 and long regarded by the United States as an Iranian proxy, despite his official leadership position within the Iraqi National Security Council and prominent role in the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).²⁷ Proxy warfare allegations were at the heart of the U.S. strikes that killed Soleimani and Muhandis – the U.S. justification for the strike was that Iran-directed groups had attacked a U.S. base and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in December 2019, and that Soleimani was preparing further attacks on U.S. personnel or interests in Iraq and in the region, potentially executed by these Iraqi proxy forces.²⁸

To understand how the escalation began, it is important to first fix the status of these forces within the post-2014 security landscape in Iraq. When the Iraqi army collapsed in the face of ISIS advances in mid-2014, Iran and the Iraqi militia forces it had long supported were among the first to respond and hold them off.²⁹ This popular and militia resistance was quickly baptized the Hashd as-Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF or Hashd is used interchangeably hereinafter).³⁰ As the name would suggest, the Hashd is a distinct security force that is comprised not of regular Iraqi security force units but of a collection of popular or militia-mobilized units, many of which pre-existed the 2014 crisis. It was created by prime ministerial decree in June 2014, and then legalized by the Iraqi Parliament as an official Iraqi force in late 2016.³¹

Although the PMF incorporated members and groups from across the sectarian, ethnic, and political spectrum in Iraq (as detailed further below), the Shi’a militias that the United States has long viewed as Iranian proxies—groups like the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and the Hezbollah Brigades—hold the reins of the PMF, and an estimated 60 percent of the PMF’s more than 125,000 forces draw from Iranian-associated militias.³² As a result, the United States has tended to view the PMF’s expanding political influence, force strength, strategic positioning, and territorial control since 2014 as a growing Iranian proxy threat, and almost since the PMF’s inception, has pressured the Iraqi government to disband or otherwise reign it in.³³

U.S. apprehension over the PMF and Iran’s influence in Iraq came to a head over the summer of 2019. In March and April 2019, the United States designated the IRGC and one of the Iraqi PMF groups, the al-Nujaba force, as terrorist groups.³⁴ This plus U.S. threats to strangle Iranian oil exports sparked increased tensions in the region,³⁵ and in early May 2019, the White House announced that it was deploying aircraft carriers and additional Air Force bombers to the region to be in position to counter a potential threat by Iran or its proxy forces.³⁶ A few days later, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made an emergency trip to Baghdad to explicitly warn Iraqi officials that the U.S. had a right to respond to attacks “by Iran or its proxies in Iraq or anywhere else.”³⁷ Shortly thereafter, all non-essential personnel were evacuated from Iraq, on the grounds that Iranian-backed Iraqi armed groups (implicitly some of the PMF) posed an “imminent threat.”³⁸ U.S.-Iranian tensions and proxy warfare continued to escalate across the region over the summer of 2019, ultimately resulting in attacks on half a dozen oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, a cyber-attack on an Iranian intelligence group, the downing of a U.S. surveillance drone, crippling attacks on Saudi oil facilities, and nearly a direct U.S. missile strike on Iranian territory.³⁹

Across these escalating tensions and tit-for-tat attacks, a core question has been whether these Iranian-affiliated PMF groups (as well as other Iranian-affiliated groups in other countries) were acting as proxies of Iran, such that any acts of aggression or threats by them might be attributed to Iran, and responded to accordingly. A second issue is whether some of the U.S. efforts to influence Iraq or to subvert Iranian interests in Iraq might themselves have been interpreted as proxy intervention, in essence a two-sided proxy war. To consider these questions, the subsequent sections will explore how the post-2014 environment in Iraq shaped the potential for proxy warfare and for external patron control.

Many of the proxies, patrons, and relationships of support generated in past periods of proxy intervention were very much present when ISIS began its rapid advance in 2014. However, the political and security crisis generated by ISIS’s takeover of large parts of northern and central Iraq further added to the number of potential proxies, and to the complexity of the proxy environment.

In the span of roughly a week in June 2014, ISIS seized a large swath of northern and central Iraq, from the Syrian border to the perimeter of oil-rich Kirkuk, from the second largest city of Mosul nearly to the edge of the Baghdad belt, the territory just north of Baghdad.¹ In the face of these rapid advances, the Iraqi security forces collapsed and fled. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa, calling on Iraqi citizens to defend the Iraqi state.²

This existential threat, and �������ٲ��Ծ�’s call to arms, sparked mass mobilization across Iraq’s diverse constituencies, parties, and forces. Most prominent was the mobilization and formation of the PMF, whose official government salary numbers have hovered around 125,000 since late 2016 (the number of Hashd may be higher if unofficial, affiliated forces and groups are also included).³ While the PMF is most known for the pro-Iran Shi’a forces that form its leadership,⁴ it includes some 50 or more groups, which span the full spectrum of Iraq’s ethnic, political, and sectarian diversity, and not all of whom identify or align with Iran.⁵

Much of the attention has focused on the PMF, but other groups and constituencies also seized the moment, adding to the plethora of sub-state forces and competing proxy alignments. Kurdish parties and forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government (the KRG) also mobilized against the ISIS threat and used the crisis moment to expand their stockpiles and regular salaried forces. KRG forces—to include official Ministry of Peshmerga forces, as well as forces associated with the PUK and the KDP parties—received support not only from the United States and Coalition countries,⁶ but also from Iran⁷ and Turkey.⁸

The PKK—the transnational Kurdish militant group engaged in an armed conflict with Turkey—had long been present in parts of north and central Iraq and self-mobilized against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. The PKK’s victories against ISIS on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border gave them greater territorial control, a number of local partners, and a strange-bedfellows mixture of patrons and allies (both Iran and the United States), all of which further complicated conflict dynamics and proxy considerations in the post-2014 period.⁹

Within both the PMF and Kurdish blocks, there were also a number of smaller, local forces, mostly mobilized from areas threatened or liberated from ISIS.¹⁰ They were ultimately bit players in the larger proxy game afoot, but they came with their own independent political valences, local interests, and international backers, which added to the complexity of local-to-national proxy competition. This included various religio-ethnic forces—for example, Christian,¹¹ Yezidi, Shabak, or other minority forces—as well as a range of Sunni tribal forces and other groups mobilized around a local political leader.¹²

Many of these smaller forces and minority groups mobilized independently, but quickly came under the salary or patronage of either the Peshmerga or of individual Hashd forces (and sometimes swapped between those camps).¹³ Some of them mobilized with the support and encouragement of foreign backers. The United States supported a small, Sunni tribal mobilization program in Ninewa and Anbar, known as the Tribal Mobilization Force (TMF) in U.S. policy circles,¹⁴ and Turkey supported the forces of former Ninewa Governor Atheel Nujaifi around Mosul.¹⁵ TMF will be used hereinafter to distinguish U.S.-supported tribal forces, as there were other Sunni tribal forces who received no U.S. support.¹⁶

After the PMF law passed in November 2016 the only legal route to have a standing force (outside of the Peshmerga) was via the PMF.¹⁷ Many of these groups then formally came under the PMF, with salaries and support provided through the Iraqi budget; however, this did not necessarily mean that the foreign ties and support ceased. Nujaifi’s forces continued to receive support (primarily training) from Turkey after they became part of the PMF.¹⁸ U.S. and Coalition support to some of the Sunni tribal and other minority forces within the PMF continued at least through 2019, including training, equipment, weapons, and some subsidization of their salaries.¹⁹

Lastly, amidst this stew of local, hybrid, and sub-state forces (hybrid denoting groups like the PMF and the KRG parties that blend aspects of formal power and authority with that held outside of, and in competition with the state),²⁰ there also was the potential for sub-parts of the state to act as proxies for foreign patrons. As the background section suggested, officials and even entire Iraqi ministries and agencies have frequently been co-opted and viewed as under the control of external states since 2003.²¹ As Iraq historian Toby Dodge has argued, the post-2003 state that emerged was less of a prototypical or Weberian state and more of a shell or an arena for competition among a series of biddable actors, all open to external support and influence.²² The collapse of state forces in 2014 and the atmosphere of political crisis generated by ISIS’s takeover made these already porous Iraqi state institutions even more susceptible to pressure and cooption by external powers. The literature on proxy warfare has tended to identify proxies as either states as a whole²³ or as the non-state rebel, insurgent, or terrorist groups contesting them.²⁴ However, in Iraq, as in much of the Middle East, it may be more appropriate to consider institutions, officials, and subparts of the Iraqi state as separate and equally biddable proxies.

The end result of all of this mobilization and proliferation was that by 2016, Iraq was awash with an even greater number of potential proxies or surrogates than ever before. There were not only more armed parties available, but much more to fight over. The 2014 crisis created huge risks and huge opportunities for a range of domestic and international parties. The potential gains and losses to be had in this moment created something like a zero-sum competition among Iraqi stakeholders, which in turn would affect the degree to which external agendas might affect their behavior.

ISIS’s takeover of large parts of central and northern Iraq, and then the question of who would have authority or influence over these areas after ISIS was ousted, put up for grabs a number of strategic and hotly contested areas in Iraq.²⁵ The areas that might be plausibly defended or claimed back from ISIS (and then dominated in their wake) included the Disputed Territories (the belt of territory that both the KRG and Baghdad claim),²⁶ the economic hub of Mosul, the ideologically significant Shi’a Shrine city of Samarra, key transit routes that crisscrossed the country, and critical border areas in Ninewa, Anbar, and Diyala.

Control over these areas could yield significant strategic and economic dividends, from control of oil fields and pipelines in Kirkuk, to the ability to profit from important commercial routes and resources within liberated areas. Many of the transit routes and border areas offered lucrative smuggling routes, as well as access to Syria, which was crucial for both Iran and the United States to maintain access and supply lines to partners there.²⁷

These areas also held crucial votes and political opportunities. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution provides for an eventual (and long-postponed) referendum to determine the status of Kirkuk and other Disputed Territories based on the “will of their populations.”²⁸ Whoever controlled these areas might be able to shift the population demographics and voting opportunities within them, helping decide a question central to the shape and writ of the Iraqi state.²⁹

Beyond the Disputed Territories issue, many commentators have noted that the 2018 elections departed from the political trends of the prior 15 years because voting did not appear to be as pre-determined by ethno-sectarian blocks.³⁰ This was even more so in areas of flux like the liberated areas, where high levels of displacement and the overall sense of political crisis had upended local political dynamics.³¹ As a result, asserting authority in these liberated areas offered those with both national and local political ambitions the chance to advance their base, or to undermine that of rivals.³²

Last but certainly not least, the fact that these areas were a checkerboard of diverse ethnic and sectarian communities, including Kurdish, Turkmen, Christian, Shabak, and Yezidi communities, also drove competition and intervention.³³ These communities viewed not only the threat by ISIS, but also the prospect of competing, rival groups taking control of their territory in ISIS’s wake, as existential threats. External actors were also motivated by identity or solidarity ties to these groups and symbolically important areas. Threats to Samarra, to Shi’a pilgrimage routes, and to Shi’a communities in Salah ad-Din and Diyala helped fuel rapid Iranian support to counter ISIS in its initial stages, while the threatened genocide of Christian and Yezidi communities in the Ninewa Plains gained international attention, and galvanized previously reluctant Western states.³⁴ As Shi’a PMF forces closed in on the divided Turkmen city of Tal Afar, Turkey declared that it would protect Turkmen groups within it.³⁵

For all of these reasons, ISIS’s advances and then its expulsion set off heated competition to control these areas, or to prevent others from doing so.³⁶ For many of the smaller, minority groups, prevailing in that competition was viewed as an existential question, fundamental to their community’s integrity and political survival. They mobilized their own forces in response and engaged in fierce competition with other rival sub-groups, allying with whichever national or international patron(s) seemed best able to protect their survival.³⁷ In the Ninewa Plains, at least five different ethnically or politically aligned Christian or Shabak local forces mobilized and competed against each other.³⁸ A similar dynamic emerged in Sinjar, with an even greater number of local Yezidi forces variously aligned to different Iraqi or external backers.³⁹

For national forces and political parties, the stakes were equally high. With so many critical components of the Iraqi state up for grabs, the way that these competing claims and contests were resolved could reset power balances within Iraq, profoundly shifting which groups held the upper hand for years to come. The most active groups to compete for and assume more territory and clout in this post-2014 period have been the main sub-state forces that had the most to gain from upsetting the status quo—the two main KRG parties and their affiliated forces, and the larger Hashd forces.⁴⁰ While they nominally supported the state and helped defeat ISIS, these hybrid forces more often pursued their own interests at the expense of state authority at both a micro- and macro-level.⁴¹

In the course of the defense against ISIS, Kurdish forces assumed control of significant parts of the Disputed Territories, including Kirkuk, and ultimately expanded their territory by 40 percent (until Baghdad retook these areas in October 2017).⁴² When asked about the KRG’s advances, specifically the Iraqi army’s inability to secure Kirkuk, KRG President Masoud Barzani was very candid: ​“I saw it in an opportunistic way.”⁴³

The larger Shi’a PMF forces were equally aggressive in expanding their territorial reach. As areas were liberated from ISIS, PMF forces moved in to hold liberated areas on behalf of the government, nominally freeing up Iraqi forces to push forward against ISIS. This put PMF forces in charge of key transit routes and strategic areas across central and northern Iraq. By late 2017, they were either in control of or maintained free access across Diyala, in large parts of Salah ad-Din, as well as in key pockets of territory in Kirkuk and Ninewa, and on the border and in key checkpoints in Anbar.⁴⁴

This competition for territorial control was closely connected to the promise of future political control, in both a local and national sense. The political and security vacuum created by ISIS’s expansion and expulsion created the potential for lines to be redrawn and power balances shifted, and for groups to be either excluded or empowered, at both a national and local level. That these opportunities for territorial and economic expansion were so closely followed by the more open 2018 elections only heightened the stakes, and the sense that there would be clear winners and losers from this transitional moment. This atmosphere of zero-sum competition is important for understanding the potential for cultivating proxy partnerships. While regional and international actors certainly saw it as a moment of profound threat to their security interests, meriting both direct and indirect engagement,⁴⁵ the Iraqi actors they sought to cultivate as proxies had domestic, not international interests, at the top of their agenda. As will be expanded upon further below, at such a crucial moment, Iraqi interests and concerns rose to the top, limiting Iraqi stakeholders’ attention to external interests, even to those of their strongest backers.

A final important contextual point is the way that the intense competition for control of key areas and overlapping linkages and interests between parties and forces generated what might be framed as a ‘sub-state’ proxy war. The strongest relationships of support and those that bear the greatest resemblance to proxy relationships have arisen between more and less powerful Iraqi actors, and driven by internal, sub-state competition, rather than external interests and intervention.

As they expanded into new territory, these hybrid actors tended to mobilize or co-opt local forces, in relationships that might best be analogized to proxy relationships in themselves. Badr and AAH (among other PMF forces) set up their own local affiliates or franchises across the territory they sought to influence and control, from Diyala, into Salah ad-Din and Kirkuk, and to a lesser degree in Ninewa and Anbar. This ranged from more natural bedfellows, like local Shi’a Turkmen communities in Tuz Khurmatu, Kirkuk,⁴⁶ and Tal Afar, or Shabak PMF around Mosul, to partnerships that crossed sectarian and ethnic lines—a range of Sunni tribal PMF forces in Salah ad-Din,⁴⁷ as well as some Sunni tribal leaders or forces, and other minority stakeholders in both Ninewa and Diyala.⁴⁸ It is worth noting that subordinate forces tended to identify with their particular patron, for example, as a Badr, AAH, or Saray-as-Salam affiliate, rather than these subgroups having allegiance to the PMF as a whole.⁴⁹

Similar to the larger PMF groups, Kurdish forces—the KDP, PUK, and the PKK—also sought to cultivate their own local surrogates or affiliates.⁵⁰ The KDP put local Sunni Arab tribal forces in Rabi’a and Zummar, a number of Kaldo-Assyrian forces in the Ninewa Plains, and some Yezidi forces in Sinjar on the Peshmerga payroll as special minority units.⁵¹ The PUK has had a more limited range of local partnerships, but did co-opt elements of the local police or other local political actors when it controlled parts of Kirkuk and northern Tuz Khurmatu.⁵² The PKK also recruited their own affiliated Yezidi force, which still maintains a hold in Sinjar, in competition with PMF and KDP aligned forces and actors.⁵³

The local-to-national relationships and conflict dynamics that emerged in these areas mirror many of the attributes of proxy warfare. Proxy warfare has been described as “warfare on the cheap” because it allows external actors to achieve strategic interests in areas outside of their home territory without the same costs and risks as direct intervention.⁵⁴ In a similar vein, as groups like Badr or AAH, or the KDP or PUK pushed beyond their normal operating areas and constituencies—effectively external actors to these local areas—local forces offered a low-cost means to broker influence and maintain a presence. They offered local know-how, legitimacy, and extra manpower, as well as a layer of plausible deniability that lowered the risks of intervention and made it possible for these essentially external Iraqi stakeholders to stay vested even when it was no longer politically palatable.⁵⁵ For example, at times there were formal restraints placed on non-local Hashd forces operating in places like Tuz Khurmatu, or around Mosul; however, these limits were easily circumvented because the larger Hashd forces could maintain influence and access via their local affiliates.⁵⁶

In exchange, these Iraqi and Kurdish patrons provided the smaller groups with arms, training, and salaries (salary allocations under the PMF umbrella, or direct salary support via the Peshmerga) as well as political protection and backing. In many liberated areas, which forces were allowed to take responsibility as the security force, or “hold” force, on the ground was determined through agreements between the larger national stakeholders, between Baghdad and the KRG, between the PMF and the prime minister’s office, or between the PMF and the KRG. In areas like the Ninewa Plains, in Sinjar, or in Tuz Khurmatu, which local forces or actors got to stay in control and dominate the local area depended on which national stakeholder they aligned with, and the political protection that this patron could offer.⁵⁷

While the lens of proxy warfare has traditionally not been applied at a sub-state level, between two or more internal parties, similar patterns of fragmentation and the rise of powerful non-state actors have generated increasing attention to this phenomenon in other parts of the Middle East. As the head of the International Crisis Group, Robert Malley as written, in these fragmented spaces, powerful non-state actors “operate as both proxies and independent players,” both challenging state control and making it hard to establish accountability.⁵⁸ Studies of powerful non-state or “hybrid” forces in countries across the Middle East have recognized that they may equally play the role of proxies or patrons, seeking external backing but also in some cases simultaneously running their own sub-state proxies and strategies.⁵⁹ Scholar Kim Cragin has coined the term “semi-proxy warfare” to describe such dynamics, arguing that the term “proxy war” fails to reflect the significant role of non-state or sub-state actors in driving conflict and surrogacy dynamics in places like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.⁶⁰

While these sub-state proxy ties and alignments appeared stronger than external ones, they were not entirely divorced from externally driven proxy strategies. External support from regional powers like Iran and Turkey, or from the U.S. and other Coalition forces, was also inter-mixed with these local-to-national support relationships. As noted earlier, U.S. and Coalition forces and Turkey provided direct support, training, or other support to some of the Sunni and other minority subgroups within the PMF.⁶¹ These other sources of support gave these smaller groups some degree of independence from the larger Hashd structure, and made it less likely that they would act as local proxies for the larger Shi’a PMF groups.⁶² Some of the Sunni or minority PMF groups also claimed that they were supported by Iran, although it was not always clear that this was through an independent relationship rather than something that was presumed or indirect because they received funding from Iranian-affiliated groups like Badr or AAH.⁶³

As a result of these dynamics, what emerged in many areas was a sort of layered proxy competition, with proxy or partner relationships manifesting between local forces and national patrons, between those national patron-forces and larger foreign backers, and sometimes also direct relationships between foreign patrons and very localized forces. The overlapping connections between local, national, regional, and international ties meant that local competition could quickly escalate up, with local conflicts bringing about national or regional ramifications; and vice versa—national or regional rivalries drove local conflict escalation in hotspot communities across central and northern Iraq.⁶⁴

The post-2014 situation in Iraq presented in some ways both the best- and worst-case conditions for proxy warfare. There were any number of potential proxies seeking resources and patronage. Given the history of proxy intervention in Iraq, many of these groups already had ties and linkages to external patrons. Moreover, the Iraqi state was not only too weak to prevent external intervention, but its divided and fractious constituent parts were as likely to aid and abet proxy competition as to block it.

While these elements encouraged proxy intervention, other post-2014 dynamics made such partnerships more challenging. The overlapping and often conflicting connections between local, national, and foreign stakeholders created a highly complex and unstable environment for proxy relationships. The quantity of potential proxy and patron relationships, and frequent flux between these groups and in their allegiances, made it difficult to gauge interests and affiliations. A classic dilemma, long recognized in proxy warfare literature, is the difficulty of fully knowing a proxy’s intentions and constraining or controlling a proxy’s actions.⁶⁵ The multiplicity of actors and complexity of relationships in Iraq increased the sort of information asymmetries that make this dilemma so acute. Moreover, the availability of different patrons and the zero-sum competitive environment made any partnerships that were formed more unreliable, because groups could easily switch sides and alignments at will.⁶⁶ It was a classic application of assumptions within principal-agent theory that proxies will be more difficult to control when they have multiple potential backers, because their options for defaulting or shirking their duties increase.⁶⁷ The prevalence of sub-state proxy relationships posed an additional challenge. Those closest to the ground, in particular the larger hybrid actors, were better able to manage the rapid fluctuations in relationships and interests than external actors, which tended to give their proxy maneuvers an edge on those driven by purely external actors.

All of these factors combined to produce an environment in which proxies were abundant, but difficult to fully control, particularly by external states. The subsequent sections will illustrate how such dynamics played out in U.S. and Iranian partnerships with Iraqi actors, and what the dynamics in Iraq suggest about the future of proxy warfare.

External support and influence were significant factors across the post-2014 political and territorial competition. However, under closer scrutiny, the proxy nature of most of these external support relationships is questionable, either because the patron lacks control, or because of much more evidence of Iraqi agency than is typically associated with proxies. In most cases, what appears to be motivating Iraqi actors’ behavior are their own internal ambitions and rivalries. This is in part due to the profile and interests of the would-be interveners, but also appears significantly due to some of the situational dynamics highlighted in the previous section, with Iraqi domestic balancing and interests overshadowing outside interests in most scenarios. Even some of the closest relationships of support appear more characteristic of an alignment of interests and ideology than the sort of directive or hierarchical relationship that tends to be associated with proxy relationships.

This section will examine some of the factors behind these trends by drawing examples from U.S. and Iranian partnerships in Iraq. Closer examination of these so-called proxy relationships suggests that external influence over Iraqi actors is better understood as the product of a convergence of interest. Such a framing may also be less prone to misinterpretation and conflict escalation than assuming that all aggressive or threatening actions by Iraqi stakeholders are proxy threats.

The largest provider of security assistance with the most overt security presence in Iraq is inarguably the United States.¹ Given this largesse, if a proxy relationship was judged by “who pays the most money and weapons, then the U.S. is the biggest proxy backer,” one U.S. official joked.² However, the policy official in question was quick to add that in the U.S. case, significant funding had not translated into significant relationships of control. None of those interviewed argued that the United States had the sort of classic armed proxies who would do their bidding in Iraq. Nonetheless, the United States has certainly used Iraqi forces as a surrogate or substitute in dealing with security threats within Iraq, and the United States has leaned heavily on its Iraqi partners (including the Iraqi government itself) to advance U.S. interests or undermine Iran’s on the political front, arguably a political proxy strategy in all but name. Thus, it is worth considering how the United States has attempted to use Iraqi partners as surrogates or proxies, and what limitations they have faced in doing so.

On the military front, the United States has built strong partnerships with different Iraqi and Kurdish forces. It turns almost reflexively to the CTS, to parts of the Peshmerga force, or to Sunni tribal fighters when terrorist or insurgent threats arise.³ However, these forces act primarily as tactical surrogates or auxiliaries,⁴ not as proxies carrying out U.S. strategic and political interests.⁵ The CTS has been nurtured for over a decade by U.S. Special Forces, and U.S. advisors still engage weekly, or even daily with CTS forces on everything from strategic development to advising on specific operations.⁶ As a result of this close and long-standing cooperation, the CTS shares a common threat perception and outlook with the United States, including great mistrust of the PMF.⁷ As Pat Roberson, the Senior Special Forces commander in Iraq explained, “If they’re with us enough of the time, they start to think like us … they believe in the same things we do.”⁸ However, the CTS has been groomed to be an Iraqi national force, not a proxy, and the force that has resulted reflects that focus. One U.S.-based Iraqi analyst offered the following rhetorical question to highlight the difference between so-called U.S. proxies and those of Iran: “If the U.S. asked the CTS to attack Iran tomorrow would they do it? If Iran asked its PMF forces to attack the U.S., would they do so?”⁹

The U.S. support to tribal forces in Anbar and Ninewa—referred to as the Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF) by U.S. officials, and as “hashd as-shairi” (the “tribal Hashd”) by most Iraqis—has an element of counter-proxy strategy.¹⁰ One U.S. military officer involved in monitoring the TMF program argued that the TMF could help harden strategic areas against Iranian influence by at least giving locals an alternative mobilization option to the Iranian-linked PMF.¹¹ Similar language appears in Department of Defense budget requests for funding the TMF—for example, support to the TMF (as well as other parts of the Iraqi Security Forces), in fiscal year (FY) 2016 was justified as “a counterweight to Iranian influence,” a way to “reassure Iraqi Sunnis,” and to deny ISIL a “safe haven” by securing territory through local hold forces.¹² However, while counter-Iran motivations were certainly present, U.S. officials more prominently justified the TMF as an anti-ISIS strategy, and support for the TMF waxed and then waned with the perceived ISIS threat, not in relation to U.S.-Iranian tensions.¹³ This suggests the TMF might be viewed more as a U.S. proxy or surrogate force against radical Islamist groups rather than against Iran.

Nonetheless, even if not a central part of U.S.-Iranian proxy competition, the TMF provides an interesting example of the challenges to proxy cultivation in the post-2014 environment. Although U.S. officials initially promoted Sunni mobilization as a key part of the counter-ISIS strategy, the TMF initiative lost out in the competitive market for sub-state forces that emerged after 2014.¹⁴ From a peak of approximately 35,000 forces, the number of registered or active forces had declined to less than 20,000 by 2019 and the program was under threat of being cut off both by the U.S. Congress and by PMF leadership.¹⁵

Even at the peak of U.S. funding, U.S.-backed Sunni forces were a marginal force, constrained (largely by Iraqi government demands) to units of typically no more than 200 forces, many operating on an ad hoc or part-time basis, and with limited weaponry and freedom to operate geographically.¹⁶ In the post-2014 environment, in which local forces had many choices of patrons, such limited support was simply not competitive. A U.S. advisor working with the TMF in Ninewa described a mini arms race emerging between local forces, with local forces willing to swap sides and work with whichever backer—the Americans, the Peshmerga, the larger PMF forces, or Iraqi forces—gave them more arms, more salary, or greater political leverage.¹⁷ Many TMF switched allegiance to the larger Shi’a Hashd forces, or disbanded altogether. As the same TMF advisor noted above observed, ​ “This is why the U.S. has trouble competing with the Iranians—they give more stuff, pay better, and do it quicker.”¹⁸

While discussion of proxy war tends to dwell on the military partners or proxies, such a lens may obscure what Iraqis see as the larger theater and goal of U.S. and Iranian proxy competition—the political arena, with the ultimate prize being influence over the Iraqi state. Within Iraqi discourse, the United States is seen as equally engaged in proxy manipulation because of its efforts to use the Iraqi state itself as a proxy against Iran. As International Crisis Group Middle East Director Joost Hiltermann argued “you could make a definition in which you say both the U.S. and Iran have proxies or that neither the U.S. nor Iran have proxies but not one in which Iran has proxies but not the U.S.”¹⁹

U.S. officials have consistently pushed the Iraqi government into taking a harder line on Iran whether in terms of application of U.S. sanctions on Iran (a significant ask given Iraq’s reliance on Iranian imports and cross-border trade) or in constraining the influence of Iranian-linked PMF groups.²⁰ President Trump publicly boasted that the United States would use its military assets in Iraq to keep an eye on Iran, implicitly using Iraqi territory as a hedge or proxy against Iran.²¹ While not as much in the public eye, U.S. domestic justifications for U.S. support to the Iraqi government also frequently smack of a proxy balancing strategy. For example, the FY2018 Overseas Contingency Operations justified support to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi forces as “a political and physical counterweight to Iranian and Russian influence.”²²

In addition to trying to shift the positions of the Iraqi state, the United States also has relied on its political partners as proxies to protect U.S. interests and manipulate the outcome of Iraqi domestic debates and stand-offs. The United States relies on Sunni and Kurdish political allies to defend U.S. interests in domestic Iraqi political standoffs, from counting on those blocks to vote for U.S.-favored candidates for key leadership position after elections, to expecting them to veto pro-Iranian groups’ efforts to oust U.S. troops from Iraq, as happened before and after Soleimani's killing.²³

Nonetheless, although the United States has certainly tried to pressure its Iraqi partners into moves that would support U.S. interests, or undermine Iran’s, this has frequently not worked out as intended. Some of the same dynamics that frustrate the ability of external actors to cultivate military proxies are also present in the political space. It is a competitive marketplace, and Iraqi actors have a range of options for support. Other external actors may offer more immediate support with fewer demands in exchange for it. Iraqi government actors and constituencies also have to balance against the reality that Iran and pro-Iranian groups have substantial influence in Iraq, and that the United States has proven an unreliable backer in the past. “Overall what remains in the consciousness of Iraqis is that the American policy is not consistent. There is no durability in America’s commitment to Iraq,” a former senior member of the Iraqi National Security staff, Safa Rasoul Al-Sheikh, explained. “We don’t want U.S. assistance to go away, but [there is] the risk that it will… So this is the dilemma. And when this type of dilemma is faced by any country, the lesson learned would be ‘don’t put your eggs in one basket.’”²⁴ Nearly all of those interviewed, whether U.S. officials, other Western diplomats, Iraqi officials, or other analysts, argued that the United States had a credibility problem—particularly when contrasted with Iran.²⁵ “The U.S. is constantly providing support but then dropping allies … the Iranians have become more reliable,” one senior Western diplomat observed.²⁶

Even among groups that might seem more naturally aligned with the United States or might in theory support U.S. positions, the immediate need for political survival or advancement have frequently trumped U.S. interests. Although the United States came out strongly in support of Sunni empowerment in the post-2014 moment, many Sunni leaders passed on the U.S. tribal support program and sided with pro-Iranian groups, either militarily or politically.²⁷ Justifying such positions, one Sunni tribal leader with the PMF’s 88th brigade said he did what he had to do to protect the equities and people of his tribe.²⁸ He said he had Iranian advisors and also took assistance from the Americans, but was not carrying out the agenda of either.²⁹

The Kurds too have been willing to make a deal with Iran, even when it frustrated U.S. interests. The failed Kurdish independence referendum left the KRG politically isolated, and more willing to court better Iranian relations, particularly given that they viewed the lack of U.S. support following the referendum as a betrayal.³⁰ During the intra-Iraqi negotiations to form a government following the 2018 elections, U.S. officials tried to engineer Sunni and Kurdish support for their favored prime ministerial candidate, Haider al-Abadi, but both Sunni and Kurdish politicians balked.³¹

Overall, the more competitive and fluctuating post-2014 environment, together with the U.S. credibility issues, have challenged U.S. efforts to create the sort of unilateral relationship that might evolve into proxy control, even on a purely political level.

Iraqi agency and domestic power balancing are not just important in understanding the limits of U.S. influence, but also in understanding the dynamics that drive the actions of Iran’s much stronger partners and proxies. Few would dispute that Iran has close relationships of support it can count on in Iraq, with the leading Shi’a PMF forces much closer to proxies than any of the U.S.’s partners. Iran can also count on a wider range of relationships of influence, including its relations with other Shi’a political actors that are less closely or publicly aligned, with the PUK and the KDP, and with a range of other Sunni and minority leaders and politicians.³²

However, even with those forces that are closest to Iran—the so-called “pro-Khameini” Shi’a PMF groups discussed above—their own decision-making, ambitions, and survival instincts rather than Iranian directives appear to drive their behavior the vast majority of the time. As one Iraqi analyst argued, key figures like Hadi al Amri or AAH’s Qais al-Khazali “are quite loyal to Iran—they know Iran is there for them—but of course they also have their own interests and agendas.”³³ This does not discount Iranian interests in Iraq nor Iran’s influence over these actors, but it does offer a more nuanced picture of what this relationship of influence means and how PMF actions that are viewed as aggressive or threatening should be interpreted.

Since 2014, the leaders of the PMF have pursued an increasingly ambitious agenda. By the end of 2018, Hashd forces held de facto territorial control or substantial influence in a wide range of territory, from traditional Shi’a strongholds in the south, in places like Basra; to substantial portions of the Disputed Territories and adjacent areas in Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Kirkuk; as well as important border areas and economic routes in Ninewa and Anbar.³⁴ In addition to this expansive territorial control, the PMF ran their own slate of candidates in the 2018 elections. Known as the Fateh alliance, it won the second highest number of votes in the May 2018 elections, giving it 48 seats in the Iraqi Parliament. In the power-sharing deal brokered as part of the government formation process, Fateh members were also accorded significant ministerial and cabinet posts.³⁵ Meanwhile the PMF as an institution has become further entrenched, more powerful, and better resourced, with equivalent benefits to regular Iraqi forces, but its own separate command and cabinet seat,³⁶ and three times the funding of the CTS in the 2019 budget.³⁷

Collectively, these territorial gains, the informal economic and political leverage that comes with that territorial control, and the greater formal political role have given PMF forces and their leaders much more significant power and influence in Iraq. This undoubtedly affords Iran more opportunities to advance its interests in Iraq, but the actors that have benefitted most are the constituent PMF groups themselves.

One prominent theory for the PMF territorial advances and border postings is that doing so advances Iranian interests in securing Iraqi borders, in capturing cross-border trade and economic opportunities, and in enabling a land-bridge from Iran to Syria and other parts of the Middle East.³⁸ While these benefits no doubt enhance Iran’s aims, the more immediate beneficiaries of this territorial expansion were the PMF groups on the ground. As PMF helped clear areas or take control of recaptured areas, their forces looted infrastructure, seized local economic assets, and took over local industries, from scrap metal to road construction.³⁹ The PMF groups that took control of key checkpoints and border posts got a cut of lucrative illegal smuggling and could demand kickbacks as a condition of passage. By one estimate, AAH earns $300,000 per day through checkpoints in the border district of Jalawla alone.⁴⁰

Such economic booty helped support the groups’ expansion and survival in a highly competitive marketplace for force. As one international diplomat commented, “A lot of what has driven them [the PMF] is their own need for expansion…you can see this particularly in the way that AAH have expanded across Disputed Territories. Most of the south is already carved up, so to expand, to meet their economic interests, they needed to move across the Disputed Territories.” ⁴¹

Moreover, for at least some of the larger, more political PMF groups, territorial expansion and the sort of sub-state proxy cultivation discussed in the previous section supported a wider national power-base and increasing political ambitions. Groups like Badr, AAH, and Saray-as-Salam used a combination of coercion and co-option, as well cultivation of sub-state proxies, to exert influence and staying power in a wider swath of areas.⁴² This helped them manoeuvre their candidates into local government positions, and gave them the potential to influence voting patterns in more areas in the 2018 elections.⁴³ It also gave them a broader national profile and legitimacy. It is not coincidental that the PMF groups that were most engaged in sub-state competition are those that came out the best in the 2018 elections and were able to secure significant appointments in the new government (although this was not entirely settled at the time of writing).⁴⁴ AAH alone went from one seat in the last Iraqi Parliament to 15 seats after the 2018 elections.⁴⁵ With greater formal political authority came even greater opportunities for expansion and extraction; a Chatham House publication, for example, cites an interview with a local AAH commander boasting that AAH’s control of one of Iraq’s ministries was worth 10 times the revenue of illegal checkpoints.⁴⁶

Control of territory and an expansive security presence have also been crucial to the PMF’s political survival and growth. Being the security actor that controls the facts on the ground, in an increasingly wide number of areas, is what has helped the PMF make the transition from a shadowy paramilitary force to a more central and powerful institution within the Iraqi state, and has helped defray calls for demobilization.⁴⁷ Illustrating such arguments, in an interview for this research, the former Minister of Interior and Badr affiliate Mohammad al-Ghaban argued that with ongoing security threats, and an Iraqi security force not yet equal to dealing with them, disbanding a force that was doing the job made no sense: “The Hashd are on the ground. They know the job. They are securing and searching area.”⁴⁸ The PMF’s ground strength has made the PMF an indispensable partner at crucial moments. When the Iraqi government decided to retake Kirkuk and other Kurdish-held areas of the Disputed Territories in response to the Kurdish referendum, they were enabled in doing so by PMF positions and relationships already in these areas (with some sources suggesting it was the PMF leading the decision, and Abadi following it).⁴⁹

The way that these territorial advances and political power plays evolved points much more to individual PMF agendas driving these actions than a larger Iranian proxy strategy. In making a grab for control and resources across liberated areas, the different Shi’a PMF did not tend to act as one monolithic, ‘friends of Iran’ group. Instead, what emerged in many areas was a competition between different Shi’a PMF factions, each trying to buttress their own forces’ position and extractive opportunities, often at the expense of other Shi’a PMF groups.⁵⁰ As they fanned out, developing local proxies and partners, the benefits of such local partnerships tended to accrue to the individual PMF groups that cultivated them, not to the PMF as a whole, nor to Iran. Subordinate forces tend to have allegiance to and be identified with their particular patron, for example, as a Badr affiliate or a Saray-as-Salam subordinate.⁵¹ At a Baghdad level, many of the PMF reforms and manoeuvres that took place in 2018 and 2019, after the end of major operations against ISIS, had more to do with intra-PMF rivalries and splits, as well as tactical moves to waylay other Iraqi critics, than with Iranian ambitions to increase control of the Iraqi state.⁵² It was a thousand small, largely parochial decisions, rather than one grand plan.

However, while Iranian influence is real, few gave credence to the idea that Iranians are driving much of the day-to-day decision-making, or even larger strategies of the PMF. As one European diplomat summarized, “What is driving their [the PMF] agenda is mostly internal … Even actors like Hadi Al Amri is not just taking instructions.”⁵³ One Iraqi researcher mapping PMF activities and economic networks in Diyala said that while there was no doubt that Iran had indirect influence on PMF actions in the governorate, he did not see evidence that Iran was directing their activities in Diyala: “They’re not in touch with Iran enough in my opinion to have that type of control,” he explained.⁵⁴

PMF leaders themselves describe operations, political manoeuvres, and deployment of troops as the result of internal deliberations within their own decision-making body. “If you ask me honestly can Iran have an influence on the Hashd—yes of course,” said one AAH representative, Shaikh al-Gharawi (also pointedly noting that Iran is not the only foreign country to seek to influence Iraqis), “[But] discussion about movement of troops, and where they go—these are all Iraqi decisions.”⁵⁵ PMF involved in the operations to retake Kirkuk from KRG control describe the calculations leading to that takeover as devolving to questions of intra-Iraqi power balances, rather than considerations of foreign dictates.⁵⁶ Former Minister of Interior al-Ghaban pointed to the wide swath of PMF activities, not just in military affairs but in building hospitals, or providing other services, and noted that these were all PMF initiatives and decisionmaking. “Everyone is saying these are militias, that they are armed by Iran. This is part of the picture, but it’s a very minor part of the picture. Yes that is going on but maybe [only] 10 percent.” ⁵⁷

PMF decisions not only appeared to be behind much of the decisionmaking and actual activities undertaken, but in some cases did so even when it contradicted Iranian plans or wishes. Most attribute the PMF decision to run its own ticket to key PMF leaders’ own ambitions, and several interviewees noted that it was Hadi al Amri’s decision to put his hat in the running for Prime Minister, despite the fact that that Iran urged him not to. As one former senior PMF leader (who preferred to remain anonymous) argued: “For sure most of the Hashd groups except the Shrine groups are pro-Iran. The influence of Iran [on these groups] is very real. But Badr does have its own identity as a national force and that’s getting stronger over time.”⁵⁸

All of this points to a higher degree of agency than is common in depictions of proxy relationships and to a large share of PMF actions and moves initiated and driven by PMF groups alone without any Iranian direction or control. The fact that such a large portion of PMF activities are self-driven underlines why the proxy war narrative can result in overstating or misinterpreting threats — even if a portion of the PMF’s behavior and motivations can be linked to Iran, a greater portion of their activities are not. Assuming that any given hostile act or threat by a PMF group has been directed by Iran can be a dangerous over-assumption.

Moreover, the degree of PMF autonomy and political independence appears to only be increasing over time. The PMF groups and figures that were most active in the election outwardly distanced themselves from Iran and projected a more Iraqi nationalist line.⁵⁹ No doubt this was partly a question of political expediency, and the need to project themselves as pro-Iraqi, rather than pro-Iranian, to win votes. As one Iraqi analyst pointed out, “These groups that are aligned with Iran have realized they cannot have a political base without moving toward Iraqism” or projecting more Iraq nationalism.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the same analyst said he saw some evidence of genuine transformation: “The experience of fighting Daesh, of having to defend the nation, and give their blood for it, also shifted [PMF forces] to this more Iraqi nationalism…in that sense, yes they are less ready to be Iran’s proxy today.”⁶¹

A second important nuance that gets lost in the proxy warfare narrative is how much the PMF’s behavior—in particular those that are the most threatening to the United States—might be equally driven by their own ideology. No one interviewed rejected the idea that Iran maintains strong influence over the PMF. Most analysts interviewed argued that there was a spectrum among the Shi’a PMF groups, and that some were much closer to proxies, while others demonstrated greater autonomy and independent agendas (while still remaining close to Iran).⁶² There is also continuing evidence of close cooperation and consultation between Iran and some groups within the PMF, even on particular operations.⁶³ For example, reporting in the wake of the January 2020 strike on Soleimani detailed joint planning on anti-U.S. operations between Soleimani and leaders of Kata’ib Hezbollah.⁶⁴

However, even with the closest Iranian partners—those most analogous to proxies—what was on display was often a shared ideology and shared sense of security priorities. While this did not make them any less of a threat (at least from the U.S. perspective), it does add some nuance to standard portrayals of these groups as Iranian puppets.⁶⁵

Examples of these sort of overlapping strategic motivations, and shared ideological framework can be seen in PMF activities in Anbar and Diyala governorates. For much of 2018 and 2019, Kata’ib Hezbollah, AAH, the Khorasani Brigades, the Nujaba Force, and other smaller Hashd contingents, held border posts and checkpoints within Anbar governorate. Although there is some evidence of these larger Hashd forces brokering local partnerships with tribal forces, this happened much less than in Salah ad-Din or Ninewa, and there appeared to be little evidence of Hashd co-opting governance structures as they did in Salah ad-Din or Diyala.⁶⁶ Instead, most of the PMF in Anbar kept to the border, including in near proximity to the American Al-Asad Airbase, in what might be interpreted as a counter-ISIS safeguard, a counter-U.S. posture, or both.⁶⁷ This suggests that in Anbar, there was a closer alignment between PMF activities and profile with presumed Iranian strategic interests and less evidence of parochial PMF interests or agendas at play.⁶⁸ Moreover, many of the PMF groups involved are those that appear closer to proxies, because of their past conduct or because they have openly proclaimed allegiance to carrying out Iranian foreign policy.⁶⁹

Diyala offers another example of potential Iranian strategic interests at play, while also illustrating how these might overlap with some PMF groups’ own domestic interests and goals. Diyala shares a nearly 200 km border with Iran. It is the only governorate where Iran deployed its own air strikes and Iran has shown a more direct interest in Shi’a control of Diyala than in other governorates.⁷⁰ However, Diyala is important to Iraqi domestic actors in its own right: it sits at the intersection of important domestic fault lines,⁷¹ offers territory that is in striking distance of Baghdad, and is the home of a divided population—Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab, and Kurdish—that Badr has long sought to tip toward greater Shi’a control (it is perhaps not coincidentally Hadi al-Amri’s home governorate).⁷² Although Kurdish forces (mostly the PUK) initially took charge of parts of Diyala after 2014, Badr and AAH quickly won out and have exerted more full security and governance control in Diyala than in any other area they have expanded to since 2014.⁷³ All of those interviewed thought that Badr, which is more dominant than AAH in Diyala, had its own ideological, economic, and political motivations for being there, but was aware of Diyala’s importance to Iran’s strategic interests.⁷⁴ As one Iraqi political commentator with close ties to Badr argued: “Iran also agrees with what they’re doing, but they [Badr] are taking the initiative.”⁷⁵ However, raising the important issue of shared ideology or interests, when asked whether Iranian or Badr interests are more at play in Diyala, he responded: “The result is one and the same.”⁷⁶

The closely aligned interests, ideologies, and worldview between Iran and its PMF allies can make it hard to distinguish what is a reflection of Iranian interests and direction, versus what the PMF have taken on themselves. Even with the PMF deployments in Anbar, which appeared closely aligned with Iranian interests, the groups engaged tend to voice their deployment as a reflection of their own interests in securing Iraq’s border or in being prepared to confront the United States.⁷⁷ To give an example, a representative of the Khorasani Brigades, Hadi al-Jazairi, described his unit’s deployment to the Anbar border as based on the continuing ISIS threat, and noted, “There is often a saying … that there is a foreign agenda influencing PMF. [But] when Daesh entered and started destroying cities we thought this is our responsibility to defend the country.”⁷⁸ He also admitted candidly that “we don’t trust the U.S. We have a problem with the U.S.,” but said that this was because of his and Iraq’s own experience of the United States, not because of Iranian directives: “The reality is showing that most of the problems in Iraq are because of Americans,” he opined⁷⁹

Such sentiments are common within PMF leaders’ public statements, and generally in Iraqi discourse. While sometimes dismissed as mere propaganda, the Iranian-linked PMF groups do largely share Iranian threat perceptions—to include both renewed threats by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and the American role in Iraq. Thus, while the PMF actions in Anbar appear less parochial and less dominated by domestic political ambitions than those in other governorates, that does not necessarily discount that they may be self-driven.

This raises a larger issue for consideration of the future (and present) of proxy warfare. Most discussions of proxy warfare presume some degree of shared interests between the proxy and the patron, the closer the better in terms of ensuring that the proxy follows the patron’s interests.⁸⁰ A common ideology or purpose is what frequently draws and binds a proxy and patron together.⁸¹ In Geraint Hughes’s framework for proxies, having a common enemy is not just a common feature of proxy relationships but is the defining attribute.⁸² Nonetheless, if so-called proxies are carrying out interests that are very near, or the same as their own, then what makes them a proxy as opposed to simply domestic actors executing their own agenda with external support? With proxies that have the level of autonomy of many of the Iraqi PMF groups, this question of whose interests are in the driver’s seat become even more significant.

The forgoing discussion suggests that while Iranian influence is certainly a factor in PMF behavior, the vast majority of PMF actions—whether their ground operations and security posture, or political and economic power-plays—are decided on and driven by the PMF itself. Without ruling out the proxy nature of some situations and behind some PMF behavior, as a whole the leading PMF groups (particularly the more political ones) show a much more significant level of agency and independent coercive power than is typically associated with the proxy label. The implications of this for the current political moment in Iraq and for assumptions about PMF aggression will be discussed in the final section.

The overall portrait that emerges from examining these U.S. and Iranian partner relationships is that while external influences are certainly present, they are not always the primary driver behind Iraqi forces and political actors’ behavior. In most cases, what appears to be motivating instances of aggression, threats, or moves that complicate external interests are Iraqi actors’ own internal ambitions and rivalries. Most of the relationships that have been labelled as proxy relationships within either Iraqi or international discourse appear to lack a strong degree of patron control, or demonstrate a much higher level of agency than is typically associated with a proxy relationship.⁸³ Instead, the relationships that appear most characteristic of proxy dynamics are the subordinate relationships between smaller, predominantly localized forces, and larger Iraqi stakeholders. The dominance of these sub-state relationships itself underlines the Iraqi-driven nature of the current moment—a climate that challenges external manipulation and intervention.

The tendency for Iraqi interests to rise to the top, and for Iraqi stakeholders to distance themselves from foreign backers, is particularly strong in this present political moment in Iraq. The intense and fast-changing zero-sum competition that emerged in the post-2014 period dominates Iraqi forces and stakeholders’ decision-making so fully that outside interests can only prevail where they tip the immediate round of competition. Beyond this elite competition, at the time of writing, Iraq was embroiled in months-long and bloody protests that not only sought to unseat the current elite-dominated political system, but also rejected the influence of outside powers, significantly Iran.⁸⁴ The outbreak of this protest movement was then immediately followed by the U.S. strikes on Iraqi territory without Iraqi consent (initially those against Kata’ib Hezbollah in December 2019, then targeting Soleimani and others in January 2020).⁸⁵ Such dynamics appeared likely to make the perception of foreign intervention even less palatable in the near future, and might affect the degree to which Iraqi actors would be willing to fully align with outside states.

In such an environment, a more nuanced framing of external intervention than that of proxy manipulation is needed. A senior European diplomat based in Baghdad commented that, in his view, it came down to a “convergence of interests” and the “need for deals to be done.”⁸⁶ This convergence of interests theory not only explains the relationship between more steadfast partners with shared ideological and strategic interests, like the Shi’a PMF and Iran or even the U.S. and CTS forces, but also the variations in less fixed relationships, as with the KRG or the Iraqi government. Within this convergence of interest paradigm, three patterns of support and alignment appear to describe Iraqi actors’ relations with their external backers:

1. Transactional Subsidiaries—For smaller forces and weaker political actors, alignment is a case of pure political (and in their view existential) survival. Ideologically, these groups are fairly agnostic on whose interests are served by their temporary alignment, so long as the arrangement is likely to protect their immediate personal or group interests. As one expert on tribal relations observed, Sunni tribal forces “don’t really care about the allegations [of being a proxy]. They are willing to go hand in hand with the Coalition, or with Iran. They will hold out their hat to Iran or to the Saudis.”⁸⁷ The same logic would apply to many of the minority forces and constituencies across Iraq. In a similar vein, the founder of the PMF’s most famous Christian subsidiary, the Babylon Brigades, argued: “I am not on the side of the Americans nor on the side of Iran. I have to defend my people. As long as they [Iran] help me—I have to take it.”⁸⁸

   Because these forces depend so strongly on the protection of a more powerful backers—whether an external state or a larger Iraqi force or stakeholder—external (or domestic) patrons have a much greater ability to establish a dominant relationship, allowing a degree of direction and control. However, that alignment is likely time-limited. In the current climate in Iraq, these groups might easily flip to another backer or stakeholder in the next round, making them at best a temporary or transactional partner—a proxy only as long as it suits their interests.

2. Conscious Balancing—Larger security actors and their political leaders are also open to switching allegiances, and in fact have to play both sides to survive. However, they are different from the smaller groups described above, because they are in a much stronger position to consciously manipulate and balance these competing interests. Their stronger position makes them less easy to characterize as proxies, even temporary or transactional ones, because they demonstrate much greater agency and autonomy even in their temporary alignments. Kurdish leaders may have a long friendship with the United States, but they also balance that relationship against relationships of influence with Iran and Turkey.

   This position comes from necessity. As one Iraqi analyst said, “The PUK and KDP have learned to live with the reality that Turkey and Iran are closer. And they’ll say, ‘Look the Americans have let us down many times.’”⁸⁹ The same could be said of the Iraqi government, which must balance strong economic and security dependence on the United States with its key trading partner and stronger neighbor, Iran.

   While Iraqi and Kurdish actors are willing to make a deal and be swayed by external preferences, the way their support tips in any particular moment is based on Iraqi or Kurdish calculations of what best supports their interests. These larger actors have longer horizons and more capability to influence Iraqi politics writ large. They thus are able to engage in decisions regarding balancing external preferences and intervention that smaller groups are unable to.

3. Ideological / Strategic Soulmates—A number of critical security actors are not only aware of competing U.S. and Iranian interests, but have a clear stake in one side or the other. Whether they’re described as proxies or partners, in the current moment, groups like KH or Badr are as unlikely to seek U.S. backing as the CTS is to turn to Iran. These groups largely share their external partner’s world view, threat perceptions, or vision for the future for Iraq. The base of the PMF parties are obsessed with Shi’a identity, and see existential threats to their community from ISIS, Al Qaeda, and neo-Baathism. Therefore, they find themselves often aligned with a similar Iranian sense of embattlement, and consistently act in ways that advance Iranian interests. The CTS see eye-to-eye with the United States in wanting a strong, Iraqi nationalist force, and of viewing overt Iranian influence, sectarian splits, or radical Islamist groups as threats to the Iraqi state. Their presence and position often pushes back against Iranian influence and control, thus enhancing U.S. objectives and interests in Iraq.⁹⁰ Given the strong alignment, these ideological and strategic soulmates could be viewed as proxies, and often are discussed as such. However, it is important to recognize how these forces’ own interests and ideologies appear to drive their behavior, on both sides. What is at play may be a more consistent and regular convergence of interests (and ideologies), but is a convergence of interests no less.

Across all three categories, Iraqi actors were happy to take external support where it was in their self-interest, and to exchange favors or make a deal with external actors. However, whether their actions advanced external patrons’ interests on a particular issue or at a particular political moment depended on whether there was a convergence of interests between the Iraqi and external actor.

Such a convergence of interest framework may not only help better conceptualize interactions between Iraqi stakeholders and forces in this current moment, but may better adjust to future shifts in Iraqi political dynamics and relations. The above characterizations of smaller or minority forces, of the balancing positions of Kurdish and Iraqi officials, and of the predisposition of the pro-Khameini Hashd groups and the CTS illustrate different ways that group interests, power dynamics, and ideology can influence the frequency and degree of alignment with external backers. However, the particular place that these different groups occupy on the domestic political spectrum and the way that this would affect their willingness to make a deal with external actors can shift or evolve over time—for example, as a result of electoral changes and institutional shifts, the past record and demonstrated interests of the external backer in Iraq, or of changing intra-Iraqi power dynamics. While past proxy dynamics do have legacy effects, these relationships of influence and alignment are not immutable, and the domestic calculations underlying a convergence of interest with an external backer can change.

This convergence of interest framework may also help limit the risks of over-application of the proxy warfare narrative, and prevent unnecessary escalation. The danger of the proxy war narrative is that any aggressive or threatening actions taken by PMF groups—of which there could be many—will be interpreted as Iranian-ordered or Iranian-inspired actions, and as such require a commensurate U.S. military response that in turn could escalate to a direct U.S.-Iran clash. This sort of misattribution has already happened. After U.S. officials and political leaders stepped up the pressure against Iraqi militias in spring 2019, Hashd groups’ altered their military posture to put themselves in a better position to deter or respond to an American attack, according to a Hashd commander close to Hadi al-Amri.⁹¹ While Hashd leaders interviewed described the moves as defensive in nature, and at their own initiative, their heightened threat posture appears to have been interpreted by U.S. officials as a flexing of Iran’s proxy muscle, and contributed to the U.S. decision to evacuate U.S. embassy personnel in Iraq and to further escalate threats against Iran.⁹²

Similar issues of attribution appeared to fuel the heightened threat perceptions and postures that led to direct U.S. and Iranian strikes in January 2020. The immediate precursor to the U.S. strike that killed Soleimani and al-Muhandis was a series of attacks and threats against U.S. personnel and facilities in Iraq in December 2019 that U.S. leaders viewed as Iranian-driven proxy attacks and threats. On December 27, a rocket attack on a military base in Kirkuk governorate killed one American contractor and wounded several others. The U.S. blamed the attack on Kata’ib Hezbollah and in retaliation launched strikes on five Kata’ib Hezbollah targets in Iraq and Syria, citing it as a warning to Iran and to its affiliated militia groups.⁹³ On December 31, 2019, Iraqi protestors, many of whom included supporters and leaders of Kata’ib Hezbollah and other PMF groups, stormed the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, breached the outer walls, and set fire to reception buildings before retreating.⁹⁴

Although there may well have been other intelligence and information that led to Soleimani’s targeting, Trump administration threats and comments in the days before and after the strikes suggest that the damage and attacks by Iraqi protestors and by Kata’ib Hezbollah strongly played into the U.S. decision to strike an Iranian general. Trump blamed the protests and the prior Kata’ib Hezbollah attack in Kirkuk, on Iran, tweeting: “Iran killed an American contractor, wounding many. We strongly responded, and always will. Now Iran is orchestrating an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. They will be held fully responsible.”⁹⁵ A subsequent tweet threatened that Iran would be held fully responsible for the U.S. lives lost and for the damage to the U.S. Embassy and would pay a “big price.”⁹⁶ This was followed by threats of pre-emptive strikes against Iran or its proxies by U.S. defense officials — the sort of strike that appeared to manifest days later in Soleimani’s killing.⁹⁷ Although the initial U.S. justifications for the killing of Soleimani suggested an “imminent threat” posed by attacks Soleimani was planning, in the days after the strike, statements by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and by President Trump suggested the perception that Iran was behind the Kirkuk and embassy attacks was more significant.⁹⁸

Soleimani and the IRGC forces under his command had without question been involved in many attacks on U.S. forces and assets, stretching back more than a decade. However, Soleimani’s direct connection with the attacks that triggered his assassination, and sparked a major international incident, was less certain. Exactly who was behind the initial rocket attacks that touched off the December and January escalation remains unclear: anonymous U.S. intelligence sources alleged that the rocket attack in Kirkuk was part of a larger Iranian campaign in the fall of 2019 to keep pressure on the U.S. through low-level (and non-lethal) Kata’ib Hezbollah attacks on U.S. bases; however, Iraqi military and intelligence officials later cast doubt on U.S. assertions, and suggested the pattern and origin of the rocket attack made it more likely an ISIS attack than one by Kata’ib Hezbollah.⁹⁹ Even if Kata’ib Hezbollah was behind the rocket attack, that does not necessarily mean Iran directed it. Groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah, as well as other Iranian-affiliated PMF groups (some of which are formally in the PMF, and some not), have in the past demonstrated that they would plan and initiate attacks against U.S. bases on their own accord.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, there has been no clear indication that Iran directed and instigated Iraqi protestors’ storming of the U.S. embassy—the immediate trigger for Soleimani and Muhandis’ killing. Given the deep well of anti-Americanism among certain constituencies in Iraq, Iran does not have to lift a finger to spur anti-U.S. protests in a scenario in which the United States has conducted strikes on Iraqi territory and on Iraqi forces (as part of the PMF, Kata’ib Hezbollah members are formally members of Iraqi forces) without government consent.¹⁰¹

The risk of the proxy label, as it has been used in ongoing policy debates, is that it conflates actions by the PMF with threats by Iran.¹⁰² This creates a high risk of misinterpretation. None of these groups have perfect command and control, and in such an environment, an errant rocket attack or missile by one angry militiaman might touch off serious repercussions and regional conflict escalation.

The dynamics surrounding external intervention in Iraq offer an important window into the future of proxy competition. Many of the same dynamics that fed external intervention in Iraq—faltering state institutions, periods of high flux and transition, and a proliferation of potential proxies—have incentivized proxy dynamics in states across the Middle East and its periphery.¹ In the words of International Crisis Group CEO Robert Malley, this recipe of “weak states cohabiting with powerful non-state actors” in a period of multiple transitions have created “the ideal circumstances for external interference.”² Scholar Seyom Brown argues that factors like the “relative rise in power of the non-state actors, and the volatility of their relationships, as well as the shifting relationships between state actors”—all of which have been on display in Iraq—are those that have made the Middle East a “cauldron” of proxy warfare.³

The proxy dynamics in countries like Yemen, Syria, and Libya also feature some of the same elements of sub-state competition, dominant non-state or hybrid actors, and local-to-regional escalatory patterns that have complicated both proxy intervention and state control in Iraq. Malley has argued that a number of highly polarized and interconnected fault lines cut across local to regional dynamics in the Middle East.⁴ In a description that could apply to Iraqi conflicts from Tal Afar to Tuz Khurmatu, Malley notes that in such environments “local struggles quickly take on regional significance—and thus attract weapons, money, and political support from the outside.”⁵ Such dynamics can generate more external intervention, while also making it more difficult to contain the consequences of any incident or clash. As Malley writes, “because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility.”⁶

The rise of powerful non-state actors, many of whom assume the formal or de facto authority of the state, and the fluid state to non-state lines this generates is a trend across the broader region.⁷ These powerful non-state or hybrid actors—to include the Hashd in Iraq, the PKK in Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or any number of powerful Libyan militia groups—continue to seek the support of external backers, but also have significant independence and autonomy, and wield their own coercive power.⁸ Like the Hashd and Kurdish forces discussed above, many of these powerful hybrid or non-state actors may act as both proxies and patrons in these conflicts. They may run their own sub-state proxies, often with greater control and perspicacity than their foreign patrons.⁹

This poses challenges to external states’ strategies of control, and also can exacerbate the tendency for proxy dynamics to spark greater conflict and volatility. As Malley writes, “The fact that nonstate actors operate as both proxies and independent players makes it hard to establish accountability for violence or deter it in the first place.” The potential for this type of escalation has been on clear display in the responses to Iran’s so-called proxies in both Iraq and Yemen. The defensive posturing or personal vendettas of one paranoid Shi’a militia commander or of the Houthi regime can easily spark a larger regional or global standoff.¹⁰

What do these findings suggest for the future of proxy warfare, in Iraq, in the Middle East, and more broadly? First, we should assume that external intervention will continue to play a strong role in domestic politics, and that Iraq will continue to be a situs for regional and international actors’ proxy competition with each other. This might sometimes manifest in clear cut proxy relationships, with a strong degree of hierarchical control and a heavy focus on the patron state’s interests and objectives, but more often it will result in relationships with lesser control and a greater deal of proxy intervention in the political and economic domains. This might include the sort of political surrogates that the United States has supported in Iraq, the more flexible and arms-length relationships that Iran maintains with non-Shi’a brokers across Iraq’s political spectrum, as well as more general soft-power projection and competition.¹¹ Even if they do not involve "hard proxies," such non-proxy relationships can play an equally important role in generating regional and international tensions, and in sparking tit-for-tat posturing and proxy alliances.¹²

Clear cut surrogate forces and relationships and direct proxy competition or conflict is more likely to take place in the sub-state arena, with the proxy patrons as likely (if not more likely) to be Iraqi domestic stakeholders as non-Iraqi patrons. The greater influence of strong sub-state or hybrid forces, the high degree of fluidity and flux, and the greater attention given to internal balancing will continue to make external intervention more challenging to control. Given this, the best external strategy may be one that embraces lesser control and greater flexibility, to better take advantage of potential moments of convergence, while taking on the least risk of blowback.

The major implication for the United States is a recognition of the deep complexity of the environment, which makes blanket policies unlikely to be effective. The intricate interplay of internal and external (state and sub-state) interests will require an equally nuanced approach on the part of the U.S. government, both with regard to the Iraqi actors or forces it would like to influence and those aligned with rival states. While external influences will be present across every Iraqi relationship and political contest, not every provocation or aggressive action is driven from the outside. Placing a proxy lens on these largely domestically driven competitions runs the risk of misattributing specific threats, and of overall increasing the conflict-prone nature of the system.