Why U.S.-China AI Competition Matters
Competing AI development in the United States and China needs to be reframed from the AI arms race rhetoric, but that doesn鈥檛 mean AI development itself doesn鈥檛 matter. In fact, the opposite is true. We are in an era of great power competition, and U.S. policymakers must pay greater attention to artificial intelligence development domestically and in China, primarily for two reasons. First, artificial intelligence will have a profound impact on state power, mainly through economic growth and enhanced military capability. Second, global leaders in AI will set norms around its use鈥攁nd around the use of technology in society writ large鈥攚hich will have important influence on other 鈥渦ndecided鈥 states and the future international order. This is why American policymakers should focus on engaging with China on AI projects without giving up critical expertise or technologies that could potentially enhance harmful applications of artificial intelligence, whether they are in governance, business, or the military.
An Era of Great Power Competition
We are entering an era of great power competition, characterized by 鈥渟truggle, change, competition, the use of force, and the organization of national resources to enhance state power.鈥 Industrial productivity, science, and technology are critical in this struggle as well, notes international relations scholar Paul Kennedy.1 Indeed, that seems to be the case. Amidst a heap of articles on the death of the liberal world order,2 there is also much concern in the American national security arena around China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea鈥攚hat political scientist Amy Zegart refers to as the 鈥渂ig four鈥 due to their various elements of state power and the threat vectors they present (nuclear risks, cyber risks, territorial aggression against U.S. allies, and disruption of the international order).3 The great power competition that Paul Kennedy identified from the twentieth century is back in full force.4
鈥淕reat power competition returned,鈥 declared President 麻豆果冻传媒 National Security Strategy in 2017.5 While the strategy isn鈥檛 without its flaws鈥攐ne historian notes how 鈥渢he grim worldview at [the strategy鈥檚] core threatens to undermine the strategies that have long made U.S. global leadership work鈥6鈥攖he document isn鈥檛 wrong in its premise: We are in an era of great power competition. The U.S. defense establishment similarly recognized this fact in its 2018 National Defense Strategy, asserting that
鈥淭he central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model鈥攇aining veto authority over other nations鈥 economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.鈥
Alongside the ongoing weakening of the post-World War II international order, the strategy notes, 鈥淐hina is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.鈥 Further, 鈥淎s China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.鈥7 This is undoubtedly great power competition between China and the United States, as then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis further emphasized when presenting the strategy document.8
In this great power competition, artificial intelligence is of vital importance and will become even more important for state power in the coming decades, particularly as AI accelerates economic growth and enhances military capabilities. As China enhances its state power through both of these dimensions, the United States must pay close attention and work to maximize its own gains in these respects.
Artificial Intelligence and State Power
Artificial intelligence is poised to contribute greatly to bolstering a developed nation鈥檚 economy. Accenture Research and Frontier Economics predict, based on research in 12 developed countries, that AI could 鈥渄ouble annual economic growth rates鈥 in 2035 while also increasing labor productivity by up to 40 percent.9 McKinsey Global Institute predicts AI may deliver $13 trillion in global economic activity by 2030.10 PricewaterhouseCoopers puts that figure even higher at up to $15.7 trillion in global GDP growth by 2030, much of which will be due to productivity increases.11
These estimates are varied, but they all rightfully predict enormous economic growth due to an explosion in AI uses worldwide.12 However, these gains will not be evenly spread. As research from McKinsey Global Institute articulates, 鈥渓eaders of AI adoption (mostly in developed countries) could increase their lead over developing countries,鈥 and 鈥渓eading AI countries could capture an additional 20 to 25 percent in net economic benefits, compared with today, while developing countries might capture only about 5 to 15 percent.鈥13 With the United States and China already representing the largest economies in the world, maximizing uses of AI within either nation could lead to massive gains in state power and influence on the global stage. 鈥淎fter all,鈥 writes political scientist Michael Horowitz, 鈥渃ountries cannot maintain military superiority over the medium to long term without an underlying economic basis for that power.鈥14 Further, there is in part a question of pure economic power: If Chinese companies don鈥檛 just develop better but also use that AI more profitably than American firms, China benefits economically and by extension has more resources to build state power generally. That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting.
Militarily speaking, artificial intelligence is also revolutionary for state military power. The People鈥檚 Liberation Army (PLA) in China views AI as a revolutionary factor in military power and civil-military fusion,15 just as the U.S. Department of Defense has similarly recognized how advances in artificial intelligence 鈥渨ill change society and, ultimately, the character of war.鈥16 China is investing in this future. The PLA has already funded a number of AI military projects as part of its 13th Five-Year Plan, spanning command decision-making, equipment systems, robotics, autonomous operating guidance and control systems, advanced computing, and intelligent unmanned weapon systems.17 In 2017, President Xi Jinping called for the military to accelerate AI research in preparation for the future of war.18 There has even been a report of the Beijing Institute of Technology recruiting high-talent teenagers for a new AI weapons development program.19 The Chinese government is undoubtedly preparing to maximize its AI development in the service of maximizing its military power.
That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting.
The United States has started to do the same, in some respects: It has established a Defense Innovation Board for ethics of AI in war,20 as well as a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to develop 鈥渟tandards鈥.tools, shared data, reusable technology, processes, and expertise鈥 in coordination with industry, academia, and American allies.21 DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, currently has 25 programs in place focused on artificial intelligence research, and in September 2018, its director announced a plan to spend up to $2 billion over the next five years on more AI work.22 But there is still much to be done, as I鈥檒l address in the last section.
Even within the U.S. military鈥檚 approaches to artificial intelligence, as one West Point scholar notes, 鈥渢he military is facing some hard questions about how it will adapt its culture and institutions to exploit new technologies鈥攁nd civilians face a tough job ensuring they answer them effectively.鈥23 There are certainly military leaders aware of this fact鈥攊n announcing the $2 billion in AI funding, DARPA鈥檚 director depicted it 鈥渁s a new effort to make such systems more trusted and accepted by military commanders鈥24鈥攜et the road ahead will have its challenges. In general, the U.S. defense apparatus鈥 willingness to engage in cultural and operational shifts will greatly influence how successfully AI is integrated into the United States military.
It鈥檚 also important to note that China鈥檚 government and its private companies will likely be less constrained by ethical and legal norms when developing AI than will their American counterparts.25 Faster deployment of and greater experimentation with AI may result, even though this may lead to perhaps chaotic or more unpredictable deployments of artificial intelligence鈥攐r, perhaps, plainly unethical uses of AI. This leads into the second main reason why U.S.-China AI competition still matters.
Artificial Intelligence and Global Technology Norms
Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Many commentators have referred to this as 鈥渄igital authoritarianism,鈥26 by which technologies like AI鈥攄eployed at scale to, say, bolster citywide facial recognition鈥攅nable or enhance authoritarian principles of state governance. Chinese companies have been complicit鈥攁nd at times instrumental鈥攊n the diffusion of the technology and practices that enable this authoritarian governance. While Western companies sometimes export surveillance technology to dictators as well, most democratic governments take steps to prevent it through export controls, such as those established in the Wassenaar Arrangement.27
Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world.
Chinese firms have exported facial recognition systems to governments in Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia. Broader categories of surveillance technology鈥攆rom national identity cards to biometric sensors, internet monitoring software, and more鈥攁re also exported by Chinese companies to governments in Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia.28 In addition to enabling insidious social control and large-scale human rights abuses, such spread of surveillance technology鈥攚hich includes AI鈥攃onsolidates power in the hands of governments that are hostile, or typically align with powers hostile, to American interests.29 Democracy is under attack around the world,30 and authoritarian uses of AI further harm democratic norms and the state of democracy globally. This is especially true for the many countries who remain undecided in their use and regulation of technologies like artificial intelligence.
This is an obvious strategic problem for U.S. policymakers, especially as Beijing has already sought to become a global leader in technology norms through an assortment of proposals at the likes of the United Nations31 and through channels such as IEEE.32 Unsurprisingly, this interest has already been reflected with respect to artificial intelligence. The China Electronics Standardization Institute, involved in standard-setting under China鈥檚 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, released a white paper in January 2018 on a framework for AI standardization.33 In April 2018, Chinese organizations hosted a major international AI standards meeting in Beijing.34 Similar to how China is proactive in trying to set global norms around the internet, it is also intent on setting global standards and norms around artificial intelligence and its use in society.35
As Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks explain, 鈥渞ealizing that China鈥檚 many large companies are increasingly global players, and Chinese-developed AI algorithms will have effects on users outside of China, China鈥檚 government aims to advance global efforts to set standards around ethical and social issues related to AI algorithm deployment. Should Chinese officials and experts succeed in influencing such standards and related AI governance discussions, the policy landscape may skew toward the interests of government-driven technical organizations, attenuating the voices of independent civil society actors that inform the debate in North America and Europe.鈥36 This may very well become a greater trend鈥攁s China鈥檚 government and private industry develop increasingly sophisticated AI applications鈥攖hat lends even further global influence to China alongside bigger economic advantage.
It鈥檚 not just through diplomats, trade negotiators, and military officers that the Chinese or American government will exercise influence in areas of competition between the two countries (most obviously Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Without a clear, viable model of digital governance to oppose digital authoritarianism, the United States stands to lose political influence over a number of countries in these areas. This, too, will significantly impact great power competition, potentially in ways that diminish the relative importance of military power.
The Chinese government, in this larger process of global norm-setting on uses of contemporary technologies, is attempting to remake the world in its image. This is why U.S. policymakers desperately need to reframe their thinking on AI competition.
Citations
- Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Unwin Hyman Limited: Great Britain (1988). Page 196.
- Among many others, see: Thomas Wright, 鈥淭he Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,鈥 The Atlantic, September 12, 2018, ; Robert Kagan, 鈥淭he World America Made鈥攁nd Trump Wants to Unmake,鈥 Politico, September 28, 2018, ; and Judy Dempsey, 鈥淛udy Asks: Is the Crisis of the Liberal Order Exaggerated?鈥 Carnegie Europe, February 18, 2017, .
- Amy Zegart, 鈥淭he President鈥檚 National Security In-Box,鈥 Stanford University, October 11, 2016, .
- This is not to necessarily equate or directly compare China with Russia, North Korea, or Iran in its state power; I do not believe that to be the case at all. China also poses a much greater long-term threat to the United States and democracy writ large than do Russia, North Korea, or Iran. For instance, see: Ryan Browne, 鈥淭op US general: China will be 鈥榞reatest threat鈥 to US by 2025,鈥 CNN, September 27, 2017, ; and The Economist, 鈥淗ow China could dominate science,鈥 The Economist, January 12, 2019, .
- White House, 鈥淣ational Security Strategy of the United States of America,鈥 White House, December 2017, . Page 27.
- Melvyn P. Leffler, 鈥溌槎构炒 Delusional National Security Strategy,鈥 Foreign Affairs, December 21, 2017, . Another scholar notes that 鈥淲hile the document is short on specifics, it reflects schizophrenia in the executive branch that cries out for treatment.鈥 See: Benn Steil, 鈥淗ow to Win a Great-Power Competition,鈥 Foreign Affairs, February 9, 2018, .
- U.S. Department of Defense, 鈥淪ummary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,鈥 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, .
- Idrees Ali, 鈥淯.S. military puts 鈥榞reat power competition鈥 at heart of strategy: Mattis,鈥 Reuters, January 19, 2018, .
- See: Accenture, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and the Future of Growth,鈥 Accenture, accessed January 25, 2019, ; and Mark Purdy and Paul Daugherty, 鈥淗ow AI Boosts Industry Profits and Innovation,鈥 Accenture, June 22, 2017, .
- Jacques Bughin, Jeongmin Seong, James Manyika, Michael Chui, and Raoul Joshi, 鈥淣otes from the AI frontier: Modeling the impact of AI on the world economy,鈥 McKinsey Global Institute, September 2018, .
- PricewaterhouseCoopers, 鈥淭he macroeconomic impact of artificial intelligence,鈥 PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 2018, . Page 3.
- For some interesting discussion of implications of AI on economic growth depending on its use, see: Philippe Aghion, Benjamin F. Jones, and Charles I. Jones, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and Economic Growth,鈥 Stanford University, October 10, 2017, .
- Jacques Bughin, Jeongmin Seong, James Manyika, Michael Chui, and Raoul Joshi, 鈥淣otes from the AI frontier: Modeling the impact of AI on the world economy,鈥 McKinsey Global Institute, September 2018, .
- Michael C. Horowitz, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,鈥 Texas National Security Review (Vol. 1: Issue 3), May 2018, .
- Elsa B. Kania, 鈥淏attlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China鈥檚 Future Military Power,鈥 Center for a 麻豆果冻传媒n Security, November 2017, . Page 12.
- U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, 鈥淢emorandum: Establishment of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,鈥 U.S. Department of Defense, June 27, 2018, .
- Elsa B. Kania, 鈥淏attlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China鈥檚 Future Military Power,鈥 Center for a 麻豆果冻传媒n Security, November 2017, . Pages 12-14.
- James Johnson, 鈥淐hina and the US Are Racing to Develop AI Weapons,鈥 June 20, 2016, The Conversation, .
- Stephen Chen, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 brightest children are being recruited to develop AI 鈥榢iller bots鈥,鈥 South China Morning Post, November 8, 2018, .
- Aaron Boyd, 鈥淒efense Innovation Board to Explore the Ethics of AI in War,鈥 Nextgov, October 11, 2018, .
- Sydney J. Freedberg, 鈥淛oint Artificial Intelligence Center Created Under DoD CIO,鈥 Breaking Defense, June 29, 2018, .
- Zachary Fryer-Briggs, 鈥淭he Pentagon plans to spend $2 billion to put more artificial intelligence into its weaponry,鈥 The Verge, September 8, 2018, .
- Risa Brooks, 鈥淭echnology and Future War Will Test U.S. Civil-Military Relations,鈥 War on the Rocks, November 26, 2018, .
- Zachary Fryer-Briggs, 鈥淭he Pentagon plans to spend $2 billion to put more artificial intelligence into its weaponry,鈥 The Verge, September 8, 2018, .
- China defense scholar Elsa Kania argues this for the PLA鈥檚 deployment of AI in particular, but I would hold this also applies to Chinese government entities and private industry in general. See: Elsa B. Kania, 鈥淏attlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China鈥檚 Future Military Power,鈥 Center for a 麻豆果冻传媒n Security, November 2017, . Page 6.
- This term has notably appeared, among other places, in: Nicholas Wright, 鈥淗ow Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order,鈥 Foreign Affairs, July 10, 2018, ; Freedom House, 鈥淔reedom on the Net: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism,鈥 Freedom House, November 2018, ; and Michael Abramowitz and Michael Chertoff, 鈥淭he global threat of China鈥檚 digital authoritarianism,鈥 The Washington Post, November 1, 2018, .
- Robert Morgus and Justin Sherman, 鈥淗ow U.S. surveillance technology is propping up authoritarian regimes,鈥 The Washington Post, January 17, 2019, .
- Justin Sherman and Robert Morgus, 鈥淎uthoritarians Are Exporting Surveillance Tech, and With it Their Vision for the Internet,鈥 Council on Foreign Relations, December 5, 2018, .
- Robert Morgus and Justin Sherman, 鈥淗ow U.S. surveillance technology is propping up authoritarian regimes,鈥 The Washington Post, January 17, 2019, .
- See, among many other sources: Freedom House, 鈥淔reedom on the Net 2018,鈥 Freedom House, 2018, ; The Economist, 鈥淎fter decades of triumph, democracy is losing ground,鈥 The Economist, June 14, 2018, ; The Economist, 鈥淭he retreat of global democracy stopped in 2018,鈥 The Economist, January 8, 2019, ; and Viola Gienger, 鈥淚n 2019, Will the Global March of Authoritarianism Turn Into a Stampede 鈥 or a Slog?,鈥 January 14, 2019, Just Security, .
- Justin Sherman and Robert Morgus, 鈥淔ive Things You Need to Know 麻豆果冻传媒 France鈥檚 New Cyber Norm Proposal,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, November 13, 2018, source.
- Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree, 鈥淭he Rise of China in Technology Standards: New Norms in Old Institutions,鈥 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 16, 2013, .
- Yan Luo, Ashwin Kaja, and Theodore J. Karch, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 Framework of AI Standards Moves Ahead,鈥 National Law Review, July 16, 2018, .
- Will Knight, 鈥淐hina wants to shape the global future of artificial intelligence,鈥 MIT Technology Review, March 16, 2018, .
- This also goes for standard-setting around other technologies, such as high-speed rail. See: Andrew Polk, 鈥淐hina Is Quietly Setting Global Standards,鈥 Bloomberg, May 6, 2018, .
- Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks, 鈥淐hinese Interests Take a Big Seat at the AI Governance Table,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, June 20, 2018, source.