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China is going to develop superior artificial intelligence and take over the world, it seems—at least if one listens to what many commentators have been shouting from the rooftops. Indeed, over the past year, American security analysts, policymakers, and journalists alike have increasingly used a Cold War-era analogy to describe issues around the development of artificial intelligence (AI)—specifically characterizing the state of U.S.-China technological competition as an “AI arms race,”¹ whereby the United States and China are presumably locked in competition for artificial intelligence hegemony.² “Ultimately, we will win the race for AI,” President �鶹������ý Deputy Assistant for Technology Policy Michael Kratsios recently wrote.³ Talk of U.S.-China “algorithm battles” even made it into a 2018 U.S. National Security Council memo.⁴

Here, the framing is clearly winner-takes-all: One nation will reap the benefits of artificial intelligence, in fashions as wide-ranging as accelerated economic growth and enhanced military capability, while the other loses out and faces defeat. But this framing of artificial intelligence is not only wrong, it’s dangerous, and it seriously hampers the ways in which American policymakers approach the management of China’s technological rise and the development of artificial intelligence within our country. The United States needs to quickly address China’s growing AI development; artificial intelligence will have important influence over the balance of international power⁵ and the future world order⁶ —but, as this report will address, a winner-takes-all arms race framing is not the appropriate lens through which to view this strategic threat.

The first chapter argues why this winner-takes-all arms race framing treats AI development as if it occurs in vacuums within the United States and China. By ignoring the interconnection and interdependence of the sectors between the two countries, this framing causes American policymakers to overlook the many mutual benefits that could arise from the furthering of global artificial intelligence capabilities. As a result, policymakers in the United States risk causing damage to AI development, missing opportunities, and mishandling AI risks—when they should focus on engaging with China on AI projects without giving up critical expertise or technologies that could potentially enhance harmful applications of artificial intelligence.

The second chapter argues why this framing incorrectly treats artificial intelligence like one technology, rather than a catch-all term that alludes to a variety of technologies. This is blatantly wrong and overlooks the varying speeds and mechanisms of AI’s development in different application areas. Once again, American policymakers may mishandle AI risks and miss out on AI upsides as a result.

A winner-takes-all arms race framing is not the appropriate lens through which to view this strategic threat.

The third chapter explains why AI competition between the United States and China is critically important, even if the winner-takes-all arms race framing is wrong. Artificial intelligence is an increasingly major factor in state power—primarily economic growth and military capability. In an era of great power competition between the United States and China, AI will therefore play an important role in the balance of international power and the future world order. Further, the country with superior implementations of AI will set important global norms around the use of AI in society writ large, which could influence governance in a number of countries.

Finally, I will offer options for reframing AI competition—away from an arms race metaphor—in a fashion which maximizes AI development in the United States while avoiding potentially problematic outcomes and hopefully limiting the contributions of AI to Chinese power.