麻豆果冻传媒

Reframing AI Competition & Conclusion

We are in an era of great power competition, and the United States and China are undoubtedly in competition with respect to artificial intelligence. AI, which is a catch-all term for a number of technologies, will impact state power鈥攑rimarily via economic growth and military capability鈥攁nd allow global norm-setting on AI and technology writ large in fashions that impact the future world order. In short, artificial intelligence is a vital element of U.S.-China great power competition. But the winner-takes-all arms race view of this competition is wrong and dangerous for American policymaking, which is why it must be reframed.

Understanding Interconnection and Interdependence

First, U.S. policymakers need to understand the interdependence and interconnection of AI development between the United States and China. Competition is a fine way to put it, but an arms race sounds as if AI development is siloed within each country. This leads to impractical statements about export controls on artificial intelligence writ large鈥攚hich anyone aware of AI research鈥檚 open source nature would certainly dismiss as impractical.

Some experts have agreed on the value of paying attention to China potentially exploiting U.S. policy gaps to undermine American technological advantages, which the export controls in some sense address. But others point out that top universities and businesses alike are concerned about 鈥減ossibly throttling a vital source of research鈥 due to proposed blocks on industry collaboration.1 And it isn鈥檛 just about research collaboration. Important funding and resources for American AI research could also be blocked as a result. The Center for Data Innovation, for instance, writes that export restrictions on AI technologies could 鈥渟ubstantially reduce鈥 opportunities for American firms to sell their AI products and services, thereby harming U.S. AI competitiveness.2 Jack Clark, head of policy at OpenAI, holds that 鈥渢he number of cases where exports can be sufficiently controlled are very, very, very small, and the chance of making an error is quite large.鈥 Further, MIT鈥檚 R. David Edelman notes, trying to distinguish in export control policies between what is military versus civilian use of AI 鈥渕ay be impossible.鈥3 In short, overlooking U.S.-China interconnection and interdependence in AI development may very well lead to policies that try to sever connections between AI sectors and thereby harm AI development in the process.

Rather than try to blindly and broadly apply export controls to AI under the myth of winner-takes-all AI development, American policymakers should focus on ways in which China is actually aided in a winner-takes-all fashion by American ideas or resources鈥攍ike through its theft of American intellectual property.4

In September 2015, President Obama and President Xi announced at a White House press conference: 鈥淲e鈥檝e agreed that neither the U.S. or the Chinese government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage.鈥5 This seemed to work initially, and Chinese hacking of American companies notably dropped for a brief period, though this didn鈥檛 directly translate to increased U.S.-Chinese cooperation on other cyberspace issues.6 (For evidence of this since 2015, see the aforementioned work my colleague and I have done to document China鈥檚 proposals for cyber codes of conduct in the UN and other international bodies, which the United States and its allies have resisted due to fundamental disagreements over issues of internet governance and so-called cyber sovereignty.)

American policymakers should focus on ways in which China is actually aided in a winner-takes-all fashion by American ideas or resources鈥攍ike through its theft of American intellectual property.

It鈥檚 clear, however, that this no-IP-theft agreement has fallen apart since President Trump took office,7 despite initial proclamations that the Trump administration would stick with the agreement.8 The volume of hacking in this vein is back up. By the estimation of one independent commission, China now accounts for 50 to 80 percent of the annual $300 billion in American economic losses from thefts of intellectual property.9 A March 2018 report from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative reached similar conclusions: 鈥淏eijing鈥檚 cyber espionage against U.S. companies persists and continues to evolve,鈥 as 鈥淐hinese state-sponsored cyber operators continue to support Beijing鈥檚 strategic development goals, including its S&T advancement, military modernization, and economic development.鈥10 Without getting too much into the nuance of the Obama-Xi agreement11 and the changes in Chinese hacking that resulted therefrom, the point is that American AI development is necessarily harmed by China鈥檚 industrial espionage, both online and offline.

The same goes for the potential security risks of Chinese investments in American AI companies; a January 2017 report to the president warned, for instance, about China鈥檚 challenge to American leadership in semiconductors鈥攚hich make the microchips in many advanced technologies鈥攙ia investment in U.S. firms.12 But between these problems and broad, sweeping plans for limiting industry collaboration on AI, the U.S. government cannot effectively combat China鈥檚 technological rise without recognition of the interconnection and interdependence of American and Chinese AI development.

Addressing the Many Technologies at Hand

Second, U.S. policymakers cannot approach artificial intelligence as if it鈥檚 one technology. Doing so treats all AI implementations as the same, which is wrong鈥攁nd leads to narrow thinking about how to bolster AI development. To see this in practice, look no further than U.S. policymakers鈥 intense focus on AI鈥檚 military applications at the cost of neglecting its non-military ones (perhaps another result of calling it an arms race).

Particularly for national security professionals who speak vaguely (and widely speculatively) of a world with automated fighting and a changed character of battle and war, military applications of AI鈥攕uch as autonomous surveillance drones or intelligently automated command and control systems鈥攁re a stereotypical answer for how AI will impact state power. This answer is not wrong. China, as already discussed, well recognizes this fact, as does the United States and other countries like Russia13 who have invested in defense-focused AI applications.

But many other non-military applications of AI are particularly important for state power in the ways they could boost the economy, and they too must be a part of policymakers鈥 thinking on the technologies captured in the term artificial intelligence. Healthcare, for instance, is a particularly promising area for AI鈥檚 impact on economic growth. Cancer detection, eye health, coma treatments, and depression prediction are just some of the varied ways in which AI implementations are already revolutionizing medicine around the world.14 Disease prediction in particular has received much research attention, insofar as AI systems may combat such issues as doctors鈥 decision fatigue.

This is not to overstate the ability of modern machine learning algorithms to identify cancers or predict epidemics; many legal and ethical issues plague AI in healthcare (e.g., data privacy, AI bias) and other challenges such as data labeling, data sampling, and clinical integration will put additional limits on how, and how quickly, AI implementations will impact the American and global healthcare systems.15 But this is to say that the U.S. government should not only focus on military applications of AI. This entirely ignores potential AI application areas with promise to improve quality of life and greatly boost American economic power in the process.

Moreover, in either case, AI is still not one technology: Facial recognition systems deployed in military drones are different than natural language processors used to spy on phone calls, and image recognition algorithms to detect brain tumors are different than intelligent systems that manage hospital supply chains. Yet all could fall under the banner of AI, and all can have important impacts on state power via the military and the economy.

U.S. policymakers must therefore prioritize investments in AI, and policies towards AI development, that attempt to maximize state power in both military and economic dimensions鈥攁ll while understanding that Congress and other bodies must address the legal and ethical issues raised by the various forms these AI implementations may take.

Bolstering American AI Capabilities

Without a doubt, the U.S. government needs to invest more in developing artificial intelligence within its borders. Congress must work to advance standard development for safe artificial intelligence16 and explore regulating certain public uses of AI that disproportionately harm minorities and other already disadvantaged groups, such as racially biased facial recognition in urban centers.17 Both of these policy actions would help integrate AI into American society in ways better aligned with democratic principles. This would further help to promote global norms around democratic uses of AI.18

More broadly, the United States needs a whole-of-government approach to artificial intelligence that its Chinese counterparts have already begun to execute. The United States must focus on deciphering the investments and policies most important to maximizing military and economic gains, while still working carefully to promote and ensure democratic uses of AI domestically. For instance, Congress should work to support collaborative health research related to AI while still working to legally protect the privacy of patient information. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) should work with industry trade organizations like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers to help set standards for ethical uses of AI facial recognition, while the American defense apparatus should do similar, parallel work in the military vein. A multi-pronged and multi-stakeholder approach is needed for AI development. This is especially true given China鈥檚 multi-pronged and multi-stakeholder investment in AI.

The United States needs a whole-of-government approach to artificial intelligence that its Chinese counterparts have already begun to execute.

Chinese business and government entities have poured billions of dollars (USD) into artificial intelligence development over the last decade.19 The Chinese government has also released a variety of plans and held a number of dialogues on further developing AI, which spans the founding of AI-specific educational institutes, creating AI majors at universities, and communicating and coordinating AI research among research institutes, universities, enterprises, and military industry.20 It remains to be seen how well these plans will be executed upon,21 but their construction nonetheless reflects government effort to bolster AI development within Chinese borders鈥攃learly, acknowledging AI鈥檚 many forms.

In sum, the Chinese government鈥檚 actions are 鈥渁 clear indication of governmental commitment to this agenda at the highest levels,鈥22 while the United States, meanwhile, has yet to implement a cohesive, national AI strategy.23 The U.S. Treasury Secretary said back in 2017 that AI worker displacement was 鈥渘ot even on [their] radar screen.鈥24 (This is only further evidence of U.S. policymakers focusing, at the highest levels, too much on AI鈥檚 military applications and not enough on its potential applications in, say, healthcare.) While the United States has strong advantages in developing various forms of artificial intelligence鈥攕uch as a talented workforce25 and highly influential research coming from its scholars and practitioners26鈥攖he country still needs whole-of-government investment in developing artificial intelligence. The likes of a Defense Innovation Board for ethics of AI in war,27 a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,28 and a new Congressional AI commission,29 while valuable steps, are not enough.30

U.S. federal agencies should all be strategizing about the research, development, and implementation of AI in their organizations, and this should be happening with top-down direction from the White House. Congress should simultaneously be exploring regulatory data privacy frameworks that seek to maintain AI competitiveness in the military, government, and industry while still protecting consumers鈥 and citizens鈥 information. But these lofty goals must start with a few tangible policy steps.

  • Stop with the AI arms race rhetoric. American policymakers must acknowledge that AI development is not winner-takes-all and that AI is not a single technology鈥攁nd then ditch the arms race framing. Journalists, too, should take greater care in reporting on AI development in ways that don鈥檛 imply a winner-takes-all competition. Alongside this, the national security establishment鈥攕panning think tanks, academia, and high-level U.S. policy offices鈥攕hould, alongside writing and strategizing about AI鈥檚 impact on military capability, take care to put similar focus on AI鈥檚 impact on economic power. The U.S. government in particular should explicitly include the influence of AI on economic power in national security and defense strategies, paying far more attention to non-military AI applications.
  • Develop a national AI strategy. The White House needs to develop a cohesive, national AI strategy document highlighting the importance of AI for bolstering economic and military power, as well as the importance of working to promote democratic uses of AI domestically and around the world. From China to France, other countries have done so鈥攜et the United States has not, despite vague term-dropping of 鈥渁rtificial intelligence鈥 in such documents as the 2017 National Security Strategy31 or the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy.32 Individual agency strategies or reports on artificial intelligence, such as that from the Director of National Intelligence,33 are not enough either, and the February 11 Executive Order on maintaining American leadership in AI34 is still not a cohesive, national strategy that compares to what China has developed. In spite of the Trump administration鈥檚 unprecedented vacancies in the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy,35 the White House should also hire, and consult with, artificial intelligence experts in the design of this strategy.
  • Bolster diplomatic cyber capacity. Especially after the closing of the Office of Coordinator for Cyber Issues at the U.S. State Department鈥攁mid broader State Department cutbacks and the retraction of American diplomatic arms鈥攖he U.S. federal government needs to devote more diplomatic capacity36 to fighting the model of digital authoritarianism that China currently champions. This involves such policy actions as helping smaller countries build diplomatic cyber capacity; building international norms that champion the value of a global and open internet and ethical uses of ethical AI; and emphasizing the value of democratic uses of AI for economic growth. Major agreements and dialogues around cyberspace and AI are occurring in international forums, yet the United States isn鈥檛 nearly active enough in delivering a clear, cohesive message that opposes digital authoritarianism. The State Department has announced the creation of a new cybersecurity bureau,37 but this should be further supplemented by greater diplomatic focus on AI鈥攐n formal agreements, standard-setting, and global norms and practices around AI鈥檚 use and regulation in society.
  • Tighten controls on selling AI surveillance products to dictators. American policymakers must also evaluate how some of its own private companies slip through the cracks of existing export controls and sell surveillance technology to authoritarians like Saudi Arabia.38 Such practices make the United States look hypocritical and serve to further justify China鈥檚 narrative around undemocratic uses of AI for social control and 鈥渘ational security.鈥 From the 2013 multilateral arms-control Wassenaar Arrangement, for instance, the United States has not implemented the 鈥淚P network communications surveillance systems鈥 control, unlike the entire E.U. bloc and most other Wassenaar participants.
  • Address Chinese intellectual property theft. While many research collaborations between American and Chinese AI sectors undoubtedly hold benefits for both countries, the United States is losing massive technological advantages in a number of sectors due to China鈥檚 widespread IP theft; and this certainly includes AI. It鈥檚 likely that the widely publicized 2015 U.S. indictments of Chinese hackers influenced the subsequent Obama-Xi agreement, so the Department of Justice should make it a clear priority today to indict Chinese hackers for stealing American IP. Among other policy changes, this would be helped by bolstering incentives for the FBI to prosecute cybercrime cases, increasing interagency cooperation, and bolstering diplomatic cyber capacity.39 Borrowing from Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal at the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government should also combine indictments for Chinese IP theft with targeted sanctions against the entities from which thefts occur, and work with potential American targets to strengthen their cybersecurity.40
  • Enact national data privacy legislation. The United States must develop a stance on data governance that contrasts with China鈥檚 model of pervasive government surveillance, while still upholding democratic norms around consumer protection. To think that any and all privacy laws will massively hinder American AI development is not only quite speculative, but follows a dangerous narrative whereby ethical considerations around AI should be cast aside in the service of trying to bolster national AI power. Not only does this narrative seek to serve major American technology companies which desire minimal regulation,41 but it also ignores the importance of the United States and its allies upholding democratic norms around AI鈥攚hich includes addressing such issues as AI bias and data privacy鈥攊n order to promote a less authoritarian global order.

While the United States needs to worry about China鈥檚 AI ambitions, an arms race framing is not the right approach. Before any true policy changes can be made to aid the United States in this great power competition with China, American policymakers at the highest levels鈥攁s well as American academics, journalists, and national security analysts writ large鈥攎ust ditch the AI arms race metaphor.

Citations
  1. Kaveh Waddell, 鈥淭rump administration鈥檚 proposed export controls could hinder tech research,鈥 Axios, November 28, 2018, .
  2. Daniel Castro and Joshua New, 鈥淢emorandum to Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration: Review of controls for certain emerging technologies,鈥 Center for Data Innovation, December 6, 2018, .
  3. Cade Metz, 鈥淐urbs on A.I. Exports? Silicon Valley Fears Losing Its Edge,鈥 The New York Times, January 1, 2019, .
  4. Alyza Sebenius and Nico Grant, 鈥淐hina Violating Cyber Agreement With U.S., NSA Official Says,鈥 Bloomberg, November 8, 2018, ; and Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal, 鈥淎 New Old Threat: Countering the Return of Chinese Industrial Cyber Espionage,鈥 Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2018, .
  5. White House Office of the Press Secretary, 鈥淩emarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People鈥檚 Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,鈥 White House, September 25, 2018, .
  6. Adam Segal, 鈥淭he U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Deal One Year Later,鈥 Council on Foreign Relations, September 28, 2016, .
  7. Alyza Sebenius and Nico Grant, 鈥淐hina Violating Cyber Agreement With U.S., NSA Official Says,鈥 Bloomberg, November 8, 2018, ; and Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal, 鈥淎 New Old Threat: Countering the Return of Chinese Industrial Cyber Espionage,鈥 Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2018, .
  8. Cory Bennett, 鈥淲hy Trump is sticking with Obama鈥檚 China hacking deal,鈥 Politico, November 8, 2017, .
  9. Adam Segal, 鈥淭he U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Deal One Year Later,鈥 Council on Foreign Relations, September 28, 2016, .
  10. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 鈥淔indings of the Investigation into China鈥檚 Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,鈥 Executive Office of the President, March 22, 2018, . Page 168.
  11. Stanford University鈥檚 Herb Lin, for instance, has good discussion on just how intellectual property theft and espionage were defined: Herb Lin, 鈥淲hat the National Counterintelligence and Security Center Really Said 麻豆果冻传媒 Chinese Economic Espionage,鈥 Lawfare, July 31, 2018, .
  12. President鈥檚 Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 鈥淓nsuring Long-Term U.S. Leadership in Semiconductors,鈥 Executive Office of the President, January 2017, . Relatedly, also see: Paul Triolo and Graham Webster, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 Efforts to Build the Semiconductors at AI鈥檚 Core,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, December 7, 2018, source.
  13. Vladimir Putin famously said in 2017 that 鈥渨hoever leads in AI will rule the world,鈥 and in that vein, the country is indeed taking steps to invest in AI鈥檚 military applications. See: Russia Today, 鈥溾榃hoever leads in AI will rule the world鈥: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,鈥 Russia Today, September 1, 2017, ; and Alina Polyakova, 鈥淲eapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare,鈥 Brookings Institution, November 15, 2018, .
  14. Alex Gray, 鈥7 amazing ways artificial intelligence is used in healthcare,鈥 World Economic Forum, September 20, 2018, .
  15. Choong Ho Lee and Hyung-Jin Yoon, 鈥淢edical big data: promise and challenges,鈥 Kidney Research and Clinical Practice (Vol. 36: Issue 1), March 2017, 3-11, .
  16. Elsa B. Kania, 鈥淐hallenges of technological innovation and competition in the new year,鈥 The Hill, December 29, 2018, .
  17. Among other arguments, findings, and recommendations: Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner, 鈥淢achine Bias,鈥 ProPublica, May 23, 2016, ; Justin Sherman, 鈥淎I and machine learning bias has dangerous implications,鈥 Opensource.com, January 11, 2018, ; Karl M. Manheim and Lyric Kaplan, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy,鈥 Social Science Research Network, October 26, 2018, ; AI Now Institute, 鈥淎I Now Report 2018,鈥 AI Now Institute, 2018, ; Justin Sherman, 鈥淣eed a resolution? How about 鈥楪uard your online presence,鈥欌 Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 31, 2018, ; Ross Barkan, 鈥淣ew York should regulate law enforcement use of facial recognition technology,鈥 City & State NY, January 7, 2019, ; and Sophie Haigney, 鈥淣ot All Surveillance is Created Equal,鈥 Pacific Standard, January 7, 2019, .
  18. For discussion of some issues in this vein, see: Steven Feldstein, 鈥淭he Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Repression,鈥 Journal of Democracy (Vol. 30: Issue 1), January 2019, 40-52, .
  19. Vikram Barhat, 鈥淐hina is determined to steal A.I. crown from US and nothing, not even a trade war, will stop it,鈥 CNBC, May 4, 2018, ; Alison DeNisco Rayome, 鈥淐hinese AI startups raised $5B in VC funding last year, outpacing the US,鈥 TechRepublic, August 27, 2018, ; and Jeffrey Ding, 鈥淒eciphering China鈥檚 AI Dream,鈥 Future of Humanity Institute, March 2018, . Pages 7, 16, and 17.
  20. Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 Plan to 鈥楲ead鈥 in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, August 1, 2017, source; Elsa Kania and Rogier Creemers, 鈥淴i Jinping Calls for 鈥楬ealthy Development鈥 of AI (Translation),鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, November 5, 2018, source; Cameron Hickert and Jeffrey Ding, 鈥淩ead What Top Chinese Officials Are Hearing 麻豆果冻传媒 AI Competition and Policy,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, November 29, 2018, source; and Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks, 鈥淐hinese Interests Take a Big Seat at the AI Governance Table,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒 June 20, 2018, source.
  21. Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 Plan to 鈥楲ead鈥 in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, August 1, 2017, source.
  22. Gregory C. Allen and Elsa B. Kania, 鈥淐hina is Using America鈥檚 Own Plan to Dominate the Future of Artificial Intelligence,鈥 Foreign Policy, September 8, 2017, .
  23. Joshua New, 鈥淲hy It鈥檚 Time for the United States to Develop a National AI Strategy,鈥 Center for Data Innovation, December 4, 2018, .
  24. Shannon Vavra, 鈥淢nuchin: Losing human jobs to AI 鈥榥ot even on our radar screen,鈥欌 Axios, March 24, 2017, .
  25. Iris Deng, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 AI industry gets the most funding, but lags the US in key talent, says Tsinghua,鈥 South China Morning Post, July 17, 2018, .
  26. Dominic Barton, Jonathan Woetzel, Jeongmin Seong, and Qinzheng Tian, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence: Implications for China,鈥 McKinsey Global Institute, April 2017, . Page 5.
  27. Aaron Boyd, 鈥淒efense Innovation Board to Explore the Ethics of AI in War,鈥 Nextgov, October 11, 2018, .
  28. Sydney J. Freedberg, 鈥淛oint Artificial Intelligence Center Created Under DoD CIO,鈥 Breaking Defense, June 29, 2018, .
  29. Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, 鈥淐ongress Can Help the United States Lead in Artificial Intelligence,鈥 Foreign Policy, December 10, 2018, .
  30. For examples of other U.S. steps to bolster AI development, see: 鈥淎I Policy 鈥 United States,鈥 Future of Life Institute, accessed on January 10, 2019, .
  31. White House, 鈥淣ational Security Strategy of the United States of America,鈥 White House, December 2017, . Pages 20 and 34.
  32. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 鈥淣ational Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,鈥 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019, .
  33. Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program, 鈥淎I: Using Standards to Mitigate Risks,鈥 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018, ; and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 鈥淭he AIM Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines,鈥 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018, .
  34. White House, Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, White House, February 11, 2019, .
  35. Ben Guarino, 鈥淭rump desperately needs a science adviser, experts say. He just doubled the record for time without one,鈥 The Washington Post, July 27, 2018, .
  36. Justin Sherman, 鈥淭o Preserve a Global and Open Internet, We Need to Invest in Cyber Diplomacy,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, December 11, 2018, source; and Justin Sherman and Robert Morgus, 鈥淔our Opportunities for State鈥檚 New Cyber Bureau,鈥 麻豆果冻传媒, February 11, 2019, source.
  37. Robbie Gramer and Elias Groll, 鈥淐an State鈥檚 New Cyber Bureau Hack It?鈥 Foreign Policy, January 18, 2019, .
  38. Robert Morgus and Justin Sherman, 鈥淗ow U.S. surveillance technology is propping up authoritarian regimes,鈥 The Washington Post, January 17, 2019, .
  39. Mieke Eoyang, Allison Peters, Ishan Mehta, and Brandon Gaskew, 鈥淭o Catch a Hacker: Toward a comprehensive strategy to identify, pursue, and punish malicious cyber actors,鈥 ThirdWay, October 29, 2018, .
  40. Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal, 鈥淎 New Old Threat: Countering the Return of Chinese Industrial Cyber Espionage,鈥 Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2018, .
  41. Graham Webster and Scarlet Kim, 鈥淭he Data Arms Race Is No Excuse for Abandoning Privacy,鈥 Foreign Policy, August 14, 2018, .
Reframing AI Competition & Conclusion

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