麻豆果冻传媒

In late 2018, researchers from Google Health partnered with Thailand鈥檚 Ministry of Public Health to deploy an in 11 rural clinics. The tool was designed to detect diabetic retinopathy鈥攁 leading cause of blindness鈥攆rom retinal scans, addressing a serious shortfall in the country鈥檚 national screening program. Thailand has roughly 4.5 million people with diabetes but only around 200 retinal specialists. In controlled laboratory settings, the algorithm had achieved more than 90 percent accuracy and performed at a level comparable to human medical specialists. The deployment promised to replace days of specialist review with instant, algorithmic triage and to improve care and outcomes for diabetes patients.

The tool was deployed across 11 clinics and 7,600 patients鈥攔esults were not as expected. The model had been trained on high-quality retinal images taken in well-lit lab conditions; in actual clinics, where lighting was variable and rooms were sometimes shared with other procedures, more than a fifth of the images nurses captured were rejected as too low-quality to process. Patients whose images were rejected鈥攏ot necessarily an indication of disease鈥攚ere referred to specialists hours away, requiring them to take time off work and imposing psychological hardship. Slow internet connections delayed uploads, adding to wait times and frustration. Overall, as a follow-up , a tool designed to accelerate care鈥攁nd proven to do so in the lab鈥攈ad instead introduced new bottlenecks when released into the world.

The underwhelming deployment in Thailand is hardly an isolated case. Since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, as frontier AI labs have competed relentlessly to announce breakthrough models with ever-more sophisticated capabilities, another challenge, more mundane yet arguably more important, has hung over the field. The most pressing task today is not building more capable models but rather deploying and fostering the real-world adoption of models that already exist. Much of the AI conversation, focused on leaderboard performance and swelling parameter counts, overlooks this challenge. Yet many of the most important questions in the field鈥攊ncluding the sustainability of the AI investment boom and the likelihood of promised productivity gains鈥攈inge on bridging this 鈥,鈥 or what some have termed a 鈥.鈥 Figure 1, from a recent , illustrates the point: A striking gap remains between what frontier models can in theory do and what they are actually doing today.1

Figure 1 | Theoretical Capability and Observed Usage by Occupational Category

Radar chart comparing theoretical AI capabilities with observed usage across various occupational categories. Blue indicates theoretical coverage, red indicates observed coverage.
Maxim Massenkoff and Peter McCrory, 鈥淟abor Market Impacts of AI: A New Measure and Early Evidence鈥 (Anthropic Research, March 5, 2026), https://www.anthropic.com/research/labor-market-impacts.

The conversation about AI鈥檚 adoption gap has thus far been largely focused on the Global North鈥攏otably in pointing to lagging or uneven workplace usage in the United States. As the Thailand example suggests, though, the underlying dynamic is global. In fact, the challenge may be particularly acute鈥攁nd, as this report will argue, carries several distinctive dimensions鈥攊n the Global South, where AI is being deployed in resource-constrained environments amid sometimes limited state capacity and fragile institutions. According to Microsoft鈥檚 , aptly subtitled 鈥淎 Widening Digital Divide,鈥 roughly 24.7 percent of the working-age population in the Global North now uses generative AI tools, compared with 14.1 percent in the Global South. That gap is growing, with adoption in the Global North expanding nearly twice as fast as in the Global South during the second half of 2025. The risks of this trajectory are evident. If AI delivers on even a fraction of its promised gains, uneven adoption will translate directly into uneven development鈥攕etting in motion what the United Nations Development Programme (borrowing from economic historian ) calls 鈥.鈥

This report sets out to better understand adoption challenges in the Global South: their nature, their drivers, and鈥攅specially important鈥攖he solutions and workarounds already emerging on the ground. The report鈥檚 distinguishing feature is empirical. While some of the challenges and remedies discussed here are known at a high level and have been the subject of valuable prior work, this report builds its case from the ground up, through structured interviews with AI practitioners and a compendium of 53 adoption case studies. This approach allows for a more granular and nuanced account than is typical in the policy literature: concrete characterization of specific bottlenecks; attention to the textures of particular contexts and sectors; and close description of the improvisations that practitioners are deploying, often without recognition or support. One of the premises of this report is that such insights, particular and granular though they may be, can inform broader guiding principles and solutions, and potentially articulate a model of AI development for the Global South that is distinct from the dominant paradigms currently being advanced by the United States and China.

Section I provides methodological background, as well as some cross-cutting observations and recurring themes that run through the empirical evidence. The evidence itself is divided into a technical section (II) and a nontechnical one (III); at times the distinction blurs, but the intent is to highlight the fact that AI adoption is an all-of-society exercise, not just a matter of successful technical deployment. In both empirical sections, we discuss a number of parameters that our research suggests play a significant role in AI adoption. For each parameter, we discuss both how it is currently limiting AI adoption and the responses that on-the-ground practitioners are already developing. Together, these challenges and responses provide the basis for Section IV, the conclusion, which tries to identify open questions and directions for further research.

Eight Findings from the Ground

  • The compute conversation has the wrong unit. Most Global South deployments fine-tune or run inference rather than train frontier models; their compute needs look almost nothing like the gigawatt headline numbers that dominate conversations in the Global North.

    Implication: Public compute programs could prioritize inference and fine-tuning over training-scale infrastructure.

  • Open source needs a deployment ecosystem, not just a model. Many grassroots organizations still use commercial U.S. providers, despite known risks, because open-source alternatives lack the technical assistance, inference hosting, and onboarding support that make commercial models easy to adopt.

    Implication: Funding open-source deployment infrastructure may be a higher-leverage intervention than funding open-source models alone.

  • AI sovereignty laws can undermine the deployments they are meant to protect. Data and cloud localization rules often prevent domestic start-ups from accessing compute; they strengthen foreign companies that can build local compute and limit cross-border collaboration within the Global South.

    Implication: Sovereignty policy should be paired with public compute investment and structured to enable regional collaboration, not foreclose it.

  • Embed AI in platforms users already trust. The friction of new workflows routinely defeats otherwise capable AI tools. WhatsApp integration consistently drives adoption (though it may pose risks of dependency and lock-in on a foreign platform).

    Implication: AI policy should design for the workflows and platforms users already inhabit, including鈥攚hen warranted鈥攑artnerships with established platforms.

  • Voice and image interfaces are essential鈥攂ut poor connectivity can defeat them. Voice and multimodal input are often the best interfaces for low-literacy and digitally excluded users; yet they are bandwidth-hungry, and the communities that would benefit most often have the weakest connectivity.

    Implication: Voice-first and multimodal design should be the default for AI systems, paired with investments in rural and remote connectivity.

  • DPI stacks are an underused source of AI-ready data, but require careful governance. Where digital public infrastructure exists, it can produce structured, AI-ready data at scale; without governance frameworks for reuse, that potential either sits untapped or is left open to abuse.

    Implication: Countries with DPI should prioritize data governance strategies (reuse, consent).

  • Community data collection is reshaping how AI is built in the Global South. Organizations are pioneering social and participatory techniques to gather data for models; the most innovative go beyond labels and capture idioms and cultural meaning.

    Implication: Participatory data collection should be supported as core AI infrastructure; royalty and licensing models can make such programs and the communities they serve sustainable.

  • Benchmarking and evaluation remain hidden sources of bias. Even models built on well-collected local data can be misjudged if the benchmarks used to evaluate them are translated from English-origin datasets, which carry Global North cultural assumptions.

    Implication: Investment in AI-ready data should extend to the evaluation layer, funding not only training corpora but also culturally grounded benchmarks.

Citations
  1. The chart below only illustrates adoption of Anthropic鈥檚 model, meaning that the real red coverage area is likely to be somewhat larger when considered across models.