麻豆果冻传媒

The Creation Story: Correspondence Schools and the GI Bill of Rights

Until the passage of the original GI Bill, federal student aid as we know it now essentially did not exist.1 After the passage of the 1944 Servicemen鈥檚 Readjustment Act, known as the GI Bill of Rights, the federal government for the first time provided educational grants or scholarships to millions of veterans. The 1944 GI Bill is rightly remembered as one of the most effective social policy programs and government interventions in U.S. history, earning the sobriquet "The Greatest Legislation." By the fall of 1946, more than one million veterans had enrolled in American universities, doubling the size of the student population almost overnight.2 In total, thanks to the GI Bill, more than 2 million World War II veterans went to college, and millions more were able to obtain low-interest loans to buy a home.

Yet what has been largely forgotten is that the GI Bill also led to widespread scandals and systematic abuses at for-profit schools, including at for-profit correspondence or home study schools. Mail-order correspondence courses, used primarily by high school and grade school dropouts seeking to improve their career prospects, were popular in the 1920s.3 But mail-order programs were largely eviscerated by the Depression and the movement to make high school education universal.4 Correspondence programs developed a reputation for misleading advertising, overblown job promises, and hucksterism, memorably captured by Sinclair Lewis in his 1922 satirical novel, Babbitt.5 However, up until the GI Bill, these programs faced little regulation, targeted adults without a high school diploma, and were not subsidized by the federal government. That all changed in December 1945, when Congress amended the just-passed 1944 law to allow veterans to use their educational benefits for correspondence courses and to raise the monthly subsistence payments to veterans that supplemented their tuition payments, to the point where the monthly subsistence payments exceeded the amount of unemployment benefits or wages that veterans could earn in some parts of the country.

In the five years that followed Franklin Roosevelt鈥檚 signing of the 1944 law, the total number of for-profit schools in the United States tripled, from 1,878 to 5,635.6 Thousands of new ones opened to serve veterans, and thousands more, ill-suited to provide an education, closed.7 Contrary to conventional wisdom, more veterans actually used their educational benefits to attend for-profit schools than went to four-year colleges and universities. And many of those programs utilized correspondence education. While 2.2 million vets went to college on the GI Bill, 2.4 million GIs used their educational benefits to enroll in trade and technical and business schools, with another 637,000 veterans taking correspondence courses.8

Correspondence programs developed a reputation for misleading advertising, overblown job promises, and hucksterism.

The abrupt explosion in the number of for-profit schools鈥攖he vast majority of which were heavily or entirely dependent on federal dollars鈥攆ed a simultaneous explosion in misleading advertising, predatory recruiting practices, sub-standard training, outright fraud, and even abuses by GIs themselves. Tens of thousands of veterans trained for jobs in overcrowded fields in which there were no job openings. GIs who wanted to collect their monthly subsistence checks but had no clear educational or occupational objective were allowed to switch willy-nilly from one field to another. And thousands of veterans signed up for recreational or avocational courses, many offered by correspondence, like bartending, personality development, dancing, and auctioneering. Others had the VA pay for TV repair courses and then dropped out of their courses as soon as they got their promised free television. In 1949 alone, nearly 550,000 veterans made course changes.9 Course and credit hours varied widely too. Bartending courses, offered in-person or by correspondence, ranged from 200 hours of instruction to seven months in duration.10

It didn鈥檛 take long before newspaper and magazine expos茅s about unscrupulous trade school owners and deceived GIs started popping up all over the country. The Saturday Evening Post ran a piece in 1946 headlined 鈥淎re We Making a Bum Out of GI Joe?鈥 Other newspapers and magazines ran stories with headlines like 鈥淗ow Many Wrongs Make a GI Bill of Rights?鈥 and 鈥淭here鈥檚 a Shell Game at Every Turn for a Man with an Eagle on His Lapel.鈥11 An article in 颁辞濒濒颈别谤鈥檚 in 1948 concluded that while the Veterans Administration lacked the funds to staff some VA hospitals, "there has been plenty to pay for the training of ballroom dancers, bartenders, amateur photographers, amateur piccolo players, horseback riders and chicken sexers鈥.we have squandered at least half a billion dollars supporting what in many instances is the greatest boondoggle of all time: the questionable Veterans鈥 Education programs."12

Then-chair of the education subcommittee of the House Committee on Veterans鈥 Affairs, Homer Ramey (R-OH), published his own piece in 颁辞濒濒颈别谤鈥檚 a week later, noting that for-profit operators 鈥渉ave established schools that are highly questionable in character鈥攕chools in which are taught subjects that are of no benefit to the veteran-student, and that milk the federal Treasury of the taxpayers' funds without giving any worthwhile return, either to the veteran or to the public.鈥13 With lawmakers鈥 concerns growing, Congress banned the use of GI educational benefits for avocational or recreational courses, many of which were offered by correspondence, in 1948. The new law barred the VA Administrator from approving the enrollment of a veteran in 鈥渁ny bartending course, dancing course, or personality development course鈥n any photography course or entertainment course; or in any music course鈥攊nstrumental or vocal鈥攑ublic speaking course, or course in sports or athletics such as horseback riding, swimming, fishing, skiing, golf, baseball, tennis, bowling, [and] sports officiating.鈥14

Later changes by Congress further narrowed the scope of schools and programs that could access GI Bill education benefits, including restrictions on training in occupations the state determined were overly crowded, a common problem for correspondence programs. Misleading advertising and solicitations from the new for-profit trade schools and correspondence schools were so widespread that the National Association of State Approval Agencies passed a sweeping resolution in 1949 urging states to take cooperative action to 鈥減revent any advertising, in oral, written, or printed form, which includes statements, illustrations, implications, or omissions, tending to mislead the public and the veteran.鈥15

The prevalence of misleading advertising and fraud made it difficult for the VA and overwhelmed state approving agencies to distinguish between legitimate correspondence programs and mail-order diploma mills, schools that automatically dispensed degrees without requiring work or evidence of learning from students. In February 1950, the New York Times reported that 鈥淢ore than 1,000 questionable or outright fraudulent schools and colleges in this country are fleecing unsuspecting students of millions of dollars annually. At least 100 are nothing more than 鈥榙iploma mills鈥.鈥 According to the Times鈥 investigation, 鈥淎 large proportion of the [questionable or fraudulent colleges] are correspondence schools and engage in false and misleading advertising to attract unwary students. Those enrolling in the courses receive promises of all kinds of college degrees as well as highly-paid jobs in government or private industry.鈥16

A House investigation found 鈥渢here is no doubt that hundreds of millions of dollars have been frittered away on worthless training."

By 1950, both congressional leaders and President Truman had become critics of the for-profit sector. The previous year, Senator Elbert Thomas (D-UT), chairman of the labor committee, asked VA Administrator Carl Gray to prepare a report on education and training under the GI Bill. Gray鈥檚 200-page study, released in January 1950, was a sharp indictment of the trade school and correspondence school industry, noting that 鈥渕ost of the problems encountered by the Veterans鈥 Administration since 1947 in the administration of the education and training program have occurred in connection with these new schools.鈥17 A subsequent report issued by a House select committee tasked with investigating education and training programs under the GI Bill found that many for-profit schools 鈥渙ffered training of doubtful quality,鈥 鈥渆xploitation by private schools has been widespread,鈥 and 鈥渕any schools have offered courses in fields where little or no employment opportunity existed.鈥 鈥淭here is no doubt,鈥 the committee concluded, 鈥渢hat hundreds of millions of dollars have been frittered away on worthless training.鈥18

When Congress passed the Korean War GI Bill in 1952, lawmakers sought to curtail the abuses by correspondence programs and trade schools.19 That law made further changes to the eligibility of certain types of programs and attempted to cut down on programs that offered little value, mandating that veterans had to identify a specific educational, professional, or vocational goal and enroll in courses consistent with that goal. Even more consequential, it eliminated the system of paying benefits directly to postsecondary institutions, including proprietary schools, and instead provided a basic lump-sum monthly payment directly to student veterans to cover tuition, books, and educational supplies.20 Due largely to the new restrictions, the for-profit sector stopped expanding and instead shrank rapidly. In 1952, more than 600,000 World War II veterans were enrolled in proprietary schools under the original GI Bill; by 1954, their numbers had fallen to about 150,000.21

In January 1955, President Eisenhower established a Commission on Veterans鈥 Pensions to study the question of what benefits should be offered to post-Korean War 鈥減eacetime鈥 veterans, and appointed his friend, the famed general Omar Bradley, as chairman. The committee, which came to be known as the Bradley Commission, took 15 months to complete its report and commissioned several studies of veterans鈥 educational benefits. 鈥淭he Government,鈥 the Bradley Commission stated in its spring 1956 final report, 鈥渨as overcharged for much of the training in schools below [the] college [degree-granting] level, particularly in profit schools.鈥22 Many veterans, the commission concluded, enrolled in courses in 鈥渙ccupational fields where the employment prospects were far from good,鈥 and 鈥渕uch of the training in profit schools was of poor quality."23

No one really knew, the commission pointed out, how many veterans landed jobs in their field of training after completing their courses. What was clear, however, was that the vast majority of veterans never graduated from their proprietary school programs. The Bradley Commission鈥檚 report noted that there was 鈥渘o information on the number of veterans graduated from profit schools who were actually placed in jobs for which they were trained, but it was estimated in January 1951 that of the 1,677,000 veterans who attended profit schools, only 20 percent completed their courses.鈥24 At for-profit correspondence schools, the completion rate was even lower. Of the 286,000 veterans who took training by correspondence in the five-and-a-half years following the passage of 1944 GI bill, just 30,600 of the veterans, or 10.7 percent, had completed their home study courses. 鈥淭he low rate of completion,鈥 a commission staff analysis concluded, 鈥渟uggests that many of the courses taken were of little subsequent use to the veterans.鈥 That finding was buttressed by a 1955 Census Bureau survey of 8,000 World War II vets which found that half of those trained by correspondence said they had not used their training 鈥渁t all鈥 in subsequent jobs.25

Citations
  1. Previous educational assistance had been narrowly limited to disabled veterans. After World War I, disabled veterans had received stipends, for attendance only, at vocational institutions. David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser, and Sarah E. Turner, eds., Earnings from Learning: The Rise of For-Profit Universities (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 170.
  2. Cited in Gary A. Berg, Lessons from the Edge: For-Profit and Nontraditional Higher Education in America (Westport, CT: American Council on Education/Praeger Series on Higher Education, 2005), 1鈥2.
  3. At their peak in the mid-1920s, nearly 500,000 people a year signed up for mail-order programs at some 350 proprietary correspondence schools, and by some accounts nearly two million people in total were enrolled in proprietary correspondence programs in 1924 (compared to an undergraduate enrollment of just over 900,000 in 1925-1926). See Robert L. Hampel, Fast and Curious: A History of Shortcuts in American Education (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2017, 1-2, and James D. Watkinson, 鈥溾橢ducation for Success鈥: The International Correspondence Schools of Scranton, Pennsylvania,鈥 The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. CXX, No. 4, October 1996, 362-363. Watkinson reports that a 1920 U.S. Bureau of Education report found that nearly two-thirds of those enrolling in for-profit correspondence programs (62 percent) were high school dropouts and one-third had failed to complete grade school.
  4. Robert Hampel reports that in the first five years of the Depression, half of all for-profit correspondence programs closed and revenues plunged by about 65 percent. Robert L. Hampel, 鈥淭he National Home Study Council, 1926-1942,鈥 The American Journal of Distance Education, 23, 2009: 7. By 1944, the FTC reported that the ranks of the nation鈥檚 correspondence schools had dwindled down to about 50 programs. Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir., 1944), February 29, 1994, 34.
  5. See Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 58-66. In his groundbreaking 1926 study of correspondence schools, commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation, John Noffsinger wrote that 鈥渁n appallingly large proportion of the schools are little better than frauds.鈥 In his subsequent role as executive secretary of the National Home Study Council, Noffsinger wrote in 1938 that FTC cease-and-desist orders, unethical sales practices, and lawsuits against correspondence schools 鈥渕ake our field the continued butt of ridicule.鈥 Quoted in Robert L. Hampel, 鈥淭he National Home Study Council, 1926-1942,鈥 6, 14.
  6. House Select Committee to Investigate Educational, Training, and Loan Guaranty Programs Under the GI Bill, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 1952, 12. Hereafter referred to as the Teague Report, named after its committee chairman, Olin Teague (D-TX).
  7. See the testimony of Harold Orlans, a researcher at the National Academy of Public Administration Foundation in Proprietary Vocational Schools, Special Studies Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., July 1974, 56. The January 1950 鈥淕ray Report鈥 by Carl R. Gray, Jr., the VA administrator, reported that there were more than 7,500 for-profit institutions on VA approval lists in 1949. Cited in A. J. Angulo, Diploma Mills: How For-Profit Colleges Stiffed Students, Taxpayers, and the American Dream (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2016), 64.
  8. The Teague Report, 92. The 1956 Bradley Commission report contains subsequent data on the use of educational benefits by GIs but it does not break out the number of veterans who attended correspondence schools and other proprietary institutions in separate categories. Still, data from the Veterans Administration cited in the 1956 report give a somewhat higher total tally of veterans who attended "below-college" level institutions under the GI Bill. Excluding those who used their benefits to return to elementary or secondary schools, 3.3 million veterans used their educational benefits to attend below-college level schools under the 1944 GI Bill and 2.2 million used their educational benefits to go to college. The President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions, Veterans' Benefits in the United States: Findings and Recommendations (Washington, DC, April 1956), 289, Table II. Hereafter referred to as the Bradley Commission Report.
  9. In 1949, 546,000 veterans made course changes, roughly 20 times as many veterans who made courses changes in 1946 (26,000). James Bowman et al., 鈥淓ducational Assistance to Veterans: A Comparative Study of Three GI Bills,鈥 Educational Testing Service, September 1973, reprinted in Final Report on Educational Assistance to Veterans: A Comparative Study of Three G.I. Bills, Committee on Veterans鈥 Affairs, U.S. Senate, Senate Committee Print No. 18, September 20, 1973, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 171.
  10. Ibid., 25. A June 1948 New York Times report also noted 鈥渢he frequent charge that veterans were wasting the Government鈥檚 money in taking dancing, flying, and other trivial lessons.鈥 See 鈥淕I 鈥楧iploma Mills鈥 Called a Fantasy,鈥 June 4, 1948.
  11. Ibid., 114.
  12. Albert Q. Maisel, "What's Wrong with Veterans' Schools?" Collier's, May 1, 1948, 24.
  13. Homer A. Ramey, "Let's Stop Abuses in Veterans' Schools," Collier's, May 8, 1948, 26鈥27.
  14. Barbara McClure, 鈥淰eterans鈥 Educational Assistance Programs,鈥 Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Report 86-537 EPW, January 31, 1986, 11.
  15. Cited in the Gray Report, 75.
  16. Benjamin Fine, 鈥淔ake Schools Rob Public of Millions,鈥 New York Times, February 7, 1950, 1, 30.
  17. The Gray Report was reprinted in Report on Education and Training Under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, As Amended from the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, House Committee on Government Affairs, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., House Committee Print 210, February 8, 1950.
  18. Teague Report, 3, 12.
  19. Mark Bolton, Failing Our Veterans, 42.
  20. Barbara McClure, 鈥淰eterans鈥 Educational Assistance Programs,鈥 11. Also see the Teague Report, 1.
  21. Bradley Commission Report, April 1956, Chart III, 288.
  22. Bradley Commission Report, April 1956, 291.
  23. Ibid., 296, 297, 298.
  24. Ibid., 296鈥297.
  25. Cited in Bowman et al., Educational Assistance to Veterans: A Comparative Study of Three G.I. Bills, 184, 186.
The Creation Story: Correspondence Schools and the GI Bill of Rights

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