麻豆果冻传媒

2. Perceptions of the U.S. Government鈥檚 Hostage Recovery Enterprise

This report will build upon the work conducted by the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation in its 2019 report, providing the first non-governmental assessment of the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30.1 This section will draw upon interviews conducted with former U.S. hostages and wrongful detainees, their families, family representatives, and family advocates to analyze the impact of EO 13698 and PPD-30 on their interactions with the U.S. government.

In general, hostage participants interacted with the HRFC and SPEHA鈥檚 office while wrongful detainee participants worked with the SPEHA鈥檚 office but not the HRFC. Wrongful detainee participants also interacted with the U.S. Department of State鈥檚 Bureau of Consular Affairs, especially when a detention has not been classified as wrongful by the U.S. government. Therefore, this study included Consular Affairs in its examination of the experiences of wrongful detainee participants. Since not all participants had the same experiences, it is important to note that participants in this study only responded to questions related to agencies and offices with which they had relevant interactions.

This section will discuss how accessible the agencies and offices that make up the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage recovery enterprise are to the families of hostages and wrongful detainees, how well the U.S. government shares information with these families, and how clear the roles of these agencies and offices are to them. In addition, this section will examine the partnership between families and the U.S. government for recovery efforts, the priority that families feel the U.S. government assigns to their cases, and how well families understand U.S. hostage policy. Each of these discussions will address the perspectives of both hostage participants and wrongful detainee participants.

Accessibility of HRFC, SPEHA, and Consular Affairs to Hostages and Wrongful Detainees

Immediately following the kidnapping or detention of their loved one, one of the most difficult challenges for a family member is knowing where to go within the U.S. government for support. JWFLF asked its participants to what degree the HRFC, Consular Affairs, and SPEHA鈥檚 office was accessible to them after learning of their loved one鈥檚 captivity.

Both hostage and wrongful detainee participants in this year鈥檚 report generally agreed that the agencies and offices that make up the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage recovery enterprise were accessible to them. In JWFLF鈥檚 2019 report, the ability of hostage families to access the U.S. government was a key concern for those who interacted with the U.S. government prior to the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30, while families who interacted with the government after the implementation of PPD-30 generally felt it was more accessible and helpful with their cases.2 The relatively positive perceptions in the 2020 interviews support the finding that the reforms made some difference.

Hostage Participant Responses

The majority, (seven of nine) hostage participants agreed (five) or strongly agreed (two) that the HRFC was accessible to them. The remaining participants disagreed (one) or strongly disagreed (one). The survey showed similar responses with the SPEHA鈥檚 office, where six of seven hostage participants agreed that the SPEHA was accessible to them. Only one participant disagreed that the SPEHA was accessible (Figure 2).

Most hostage participants agreed that they can reach out and call the HRFC at any time of the day. Other participants, however, expressed a decrease in accessibility to the HRFC with one participant sharing, 鈥渋t had once been accessible but is not anymore, even with ongoing issues and concerns.鈥

While a majority of hostage participants agreed that the SPEHA鈥檚 office was accessible, some respondents shared their concerns over having less access to the SPEHA鈥檚 office due to the loss of Special Envoy Robert O鈥橞rien when he was appointed national security advisor, and other personnel within the office. One participant shared that 鈥渋t has been taking the SPEHA鈥檚 office longer to respond to our emails and requests鈥 since the departure of O鈥橞rien.

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

A slight majority, (seven of twelve) wrongful detainee participants agreed that Consular Affairs was accessible to them while the remaining participants strongly disagreed (two) or neither agreed nor disagreed (three). The perception of the SPEHA鈥檚 office was similar, showing a slight majority (five of nine) participants who agreed that the SPEHA鈥檚 office was accessible, while the remaining participants strongly disagreed (two) or neither agreed nor disagreed (two) (Figure 2). It is important to note that out of the eight wrongful detainee cases represented in this study, seven of the cases were recognized as wrongful or unlawful by the U.S. government, while one was not.

One family advocate shared that the family they were supporting 鈥渉ad to work way too hard to get the State Department鈥檚 attention and help.鈥 Other participants shared similar responses, saying that 鈥渟ometimes [Consular Affairs] will answer and other times they don鈥檛. I had to use a third party to get any attention.鈥 Another participant shared, 鈥渋t took five months for Consular Affairs to initially respond to our case. No one returned phone calls or emails.鈥

Another participant expressed, 鈥淚 started out trying to engage with the State Department at all levels, all the way up to the deputy secretary of state. My focus has more recently been shifted to the National Security Council because there seems to be a level of infighting going on at the lower level of the State Department and there seems to be differences [of opinion] in how my loved one鈥檚 case should be handled.鈥 That participant continued, saying, 鈥渨e鈥檙e going to the National Security Council to push for clarity on who is working on my loved one鈥檚 case so that there is some sort of continuity on how they are going to move forward.鈥

Access to the SPEHA鈥檚 office was solely dependent on whether a participant鈥檚 case was considered a wrongful detention. Participants shared that they remained working with Consular Affairs until their case was classified as a wrongful detention by the U.S. government. Several participants expressed their concern over not having access to the SPEHA because they believed that their case was 鈥渞eally a hostage situation because [my loved one] is really being held as a political pawn. At some point, working with Consular Affairs is not enough because we need a diplomatic solution to our case.鈥3

Even though wrongful detainee participants agreed that both offices were accessible, several participants shared their concerns over the high turnover rate within Consular Affairs and the SPEHA鈥檚 office. For example, one participant shared, 鈥渨hen turnover occurs, it puts a hard stop on our case.鈥 Other participants reiterated this concern by sharing, 鈥渢hey [State Department] are accessible, but high turnover rate is a big problem. Each time there was a change, there鈥檚 a hard reset.鈥 For some participants, accessibility was not the main concern, getting results was a more important issue. One participant shared, 鈥渢he problem is not communication, it is getting results! I don鈥檛 feel neglected, I have had several calls, I fly in for meetings, I鈥檝e been able to meet with senior officials. My problem is getting people at State to commit to the current policy and implement it.鈥

Consistency and Accuracy of Information

The consistency and accuracy of the information shared with hostage families was another major concern surrounding the need to improve the U.S. government鈥檚 interactions with hostage families. During the interviews for this report, participants generally expressed a lack of clear satisfaction with the consistency and accuracy of information shared with families. Prior to the implementation of EO 13698 and PPD-30, hostage families reported receiving inconsistent and sometimes contradictory information. After the implementation of PPD-30, 2019 respondents reported a significant increase from pre-PPD-30 respondents regarding consistency and accuracy of the information they received from the U.S. government.4 During the interviews for the 2020 report, participant responses showed a decrease in the satisfaction with the consistency and accuracy of information shared with families compared to 2019 responses.

Hostage Participant Responses

The majority (five of eight) hostage respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that they received consistent and accurate information from the HRFC. Two participants disagreed while only one participant agreed that the HRFC was consistent and accurate when sharing information about their case. Regarding the SPEHA鈥檚 office, only one individual agreed that the SPEHA鈥檚 office provided accurate and consistent information about their case while one participant strongly disagreed and another disagreed, and two neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 3). A typical response from family members was that the SPEHA鈥檚 office did not provide 鈥渆nough information on their part. It's mostly us giving them information instead of them giving us information.鈥

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

The majority (six of ten) of wrongful detainee respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that they received consistent and accurate information from Consular Affairs. Others strongly disagreed (one), disagreed (one), or agreed (two). With regard to the SPEHA鈥檚 office the majority (five of eight) of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that they received consistent and accurate information. The remaining respondents strongly disagreed (two) and disagreed (one) (Figure 3).

Overall, the largest issue wrongful detainee families raised about consistency and accuracy of information being shared at the Department of State was related to their concern over the 鈥渞eally high鈥 turnover rate. One family shared, 鈥渨e don't get a lot of information. There鈥檚 also a high turnover rate which leads to a lot of misinformation. Our points of contact change constantly. We鈥檝e had 3-4 different points of contact at Consular Affairs.鈥

Other wrongful detainee families shared that they requested weekly calls from Consular Affairs because they grew tired of not receiving any information and claimed that this was because Consular Affairs was short staffed. Family members, therefore, settled on bi-monthly updates. 鈥淚t鈥檚 still frustrating because we are not receiving the allotted 30 minutes and are asked questions that they [Consular Affairs] should already know.鈥 This leads some family members to believe that Consular Affairs is 鈥渇illing the time up by asking questions that are already in the file.鈥

Another family shared their frustration because they are 鈥渘ot being updated by anyone at State and have to continue to request meetings to get any information whatsoever. So, it鈥檚 difficult, all of my answers are predicated [on whether] I would have any meetings at all if I wasn鈥檛 bugging people constantly.鈥

Regarding wrongful detainee interactions with the SPEHA鈥檚 office, some families expressed how much they liked working with former Special Envoy Robert O鈥橞rien, but responses became very limited and 鈥渉ard to comment鈥 on because the SPEHA鈥檚 position has been vacant for so long.

One family member commented on the difficulty of getting a point of contact at the SPEHA鈥檚 office and that it was really 鈥渦p to us to get information.鈥 In addition, another family shared their impression that not having an appointed SPEHA left the office with limited influence to make decisions that would benefit their loved one鈥檚 case. One participant shared, 鈥渢hey are doing what they can but [they] are not in the position to make decisions as much as they would like to.鈥

Understanding of U.S. Departmental Roles

JWFLF鈥檚 2019 report showed that the implementation of PPD-30 had an important impact on family members鈥 understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various organizations within the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage enterprise.5 JWFLF asked its participants if they understood the role the HRFC, SPEHA, and Consular Affairs played in support of hostage or wrongful detainee recovery. Hostage respondents to this year鈥檚 report generally understood the roles of the HRFC and SPEHA, though some indicated they did not. Wrongful detainee respondents were somewhat more mixed in their assessment of whether or not they clearly understood the role of Consular Affairs.

Hostage Participant Responses

The majority (six of nine) of hostage participants who interacted with the HRFC strongly agreed (one) or agreed (five) that they had a clear understanding of the role the HRFC plays in support of hostage recovery and family engagement. Other participants either disagreed (two) or neither agreed nor disagreed (one). Regarding the SPEHA鈥檚 office, three participants agreed and two participants disagreed. The remaining two participants neither agreed nor disagreed that they understood the role the SPEHA鈥檚 office played in support of hostage recovery (Figure 4).

A common frustration shared by participants was confusion about whether the HRFC or SPEHA鈥檚 office was the lead agency in their loved one鈥檚 case. One family member shared, 鈥淚鈥檓 not sure who has the lead on our case. You don鈥檛 know when to go to either the SPEHA or HRFC.鈥 Another family member shared, 鈥淚 don鈥檛 know who I鈥檓 supposed to be talking to.鈥 In some cases, the confusion appeared to have been based mostly on poor communication with the families, rather than interagency coordination. In other cases, there was confusion within the organizations themselves. According to one participant, neither the HRFC nor the SPEHA鈥檚 office was clear on which organization should be leading their case. This confusion within the hostage recovery enterprise was particularly upsetting for hostage participants, who were frustrated that bureaucratic confusion could hamper efforts to secure their loved ones鈥 releases and extend their loved ones鈥 arduous captivities.

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

Wrongful detainee participants reported mixed levels of understanding of the role of Consular Affairs. Half (five of ten) of JWFLF鈥檚 participants who interacted with Consular Affairs strongly agreed (two) or agreed (three) that they had a clear understanding of the role that Consular Affairs played in support of their loved one鈥檚 recovery. Others strongly disagreed (one), disagreed (two), or neither agreed nor disagreed (two) (Figure 4).

One participant expressed, 鈥淚'm having a hard time nailing down what exactly Consular Affairs is and what it's doing. I'm not sure exactly who I'm talking to. Initially, I thought Consular Affairs was responsible for participating in the negotiating, but recently was told they were not. So, I do not know who I've been talking to and what their roles are. I'm trying very hard to understand what Consular Affairs is.鈥

Other participants had a better understanding of the role of Consular Affairs. One participant explained that the office was responsible for visiting their family members in prison and checking on their overall wellness. Consular officers try to determine if their loved one is being fed, receiving legal representation, and whether they are being subjected to inhumane treatment such as torture and solitary confinement. However, these same participants were unclear if Consular Affairs was responsible for engaging with foreign governments in a more diplomatic manner. This concern was raised after a participant expressed concerns that the support they were receiving from Consular Affairs was insufficient to secure the release of their loved one. 鈥淚t鈥檚 really a hostage situation,鈥 the participant said, 鈥渂ecause [my family member] is really being held as a political pawn. At some point, working with Consular Affairs is not enough because we need a diplomatic solution to our case.鈥

Most wrongful detainee participants who interacted with the SPEHA鈥檚 office (five of eight) strongly agreed (one) or agreed (four) that they had a clear understanding of the role the SPEHA鈥檚 office played in recovery of their loved one. One family member disagreed and the remaining two participants neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 4). While wrongful detainee participants generally understood the role of the SPEHA鈥檚 office in their loved one鈥檚 case, there was some confusion about what tools the SPEHA had to secure their loved one鈥檚 release. 鈥淐an they make concessions?鈥 one wrongful detainee participant asked, 鈥淐an they provide aid [to a foreign government]? Arrange prisoner swaps? What can the SPEHA鈥檚 office legally do?鈥

Information Sharing

Information sharing was a challenge raised by several participants in JWFLF鈥檚 initial 2019 examination of the U.S. government鈥檚 reorganization of its hostage recovery enterprise.6 This trend continued in the interviews undertaken as part of this report, with many of the same issues reappearing in the comments from JWFLF鈥檚 participants in this year鈥檚 responses. Hostage participants, in general, remain concerned about the level of completeness of the information they receive, while wrongful detainee participants were generally dissatisfied with the level of communication from the U.S. government related to their loved one鈥檚 case.

Hostage Participant Responses

The majority (four of six) of participants who interacted with the HRFC strongly agreed (two) or agreed (two) that they received a steady flow of information regarding their loved one鈥檚 case. Other participants disagreed (one) and strongly disagreed (one). The same question yielded similar results regarding the SPEHA鈥檚 office. The majority (three of five) agreed (two) or strongly agreed (one). The remaining participants neither agreed nor disagreed (one) and strongly disagreed (one) that they received a steady flow of information regarding their loved one鈥檚 case (Figure 5).

鈥淚 have found when there is important information,鈥 one participant shared, 鈥淚 receive it right away from the HRFC.鈥 Participants shared that the government also kept families informed about broader concerns within the hostage community. 鈥淭he HRFC and Victim鈥檚 Services were great about letting families know about other releases before it hit the news,鈥 another participant shared.

Other hostage participants were much less satisfied with the U.S. government鈥檚 information sharing. One participant said that they felt that the government shared 鈥渋nsufficient information鈥 regarding their loved one's case, which left them feeling as though they did not 鈥渉ave all the details鈥 and that they had no choice but to 鈥渢rust [the U.S. government] blindly.鈥 Another participant noted that 鈥渢here has been very little information that has come from the U.S. government鈥 about their loved one鈥檚 case. These experiences left the participant with very little confidence that the U.S. government would find a solution for their loved one鈥檚 case.

Regardless of their level of satisfaction with the government鈥檚 information sharing, most hostage participants brought up frustrations with the declassification of information within both the HRFC and the SPEHA鈥檚 office. Participants, broadly, expressed a desire to have increased access to information surrounding their loved ones鈥 cases, including complete, full, and timely access to all information and activities pertinent to the case. Participants expressed concerns with the restrictions placed on the U.S. government鈥檚 ability to declassify information and its willingness to do so. Several participants requested that the government create a mechanism through which they could receive an interim, limited security clearance in order to allow them to view the classified material pertinent to their case.

Another concern raised by hostage participants was information sharing between the government and third-party intermediaries (TPIs) working on behalf of the hostage family. One participant noted that, while the U.S. government will share information with them, they cannot share it with their TPI. 鈥淚 find it a hindrance,鈥 the participant said. 鈥淚 have a person who is doing a lot of work, but the [government] is not working with him.鈥 鈥淚 can鈥檛 utilize the information,鈥 the same participant explained, 鈥渂ut if I have a person working on my behalf who can, then why can鈥檛 I share the information?鈥 鈥淚 don鈥檛 get the sense that the government is trying to push [TPIs] aside,鈥 said another participant. 鈥淲hen it comes to the bigger issue of what they're able to share, however,鈥 the participant continued, 鈥渋t's stifled.鈥

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

All the wrongful detainee participants strongly disagreed (two) or disagreed (three) that they had received a steady flow of information regarding their loved one鈥檚 case from Consular Affairs. Results were slightly more favorable from the SPEHA鈥檚 office where two participants agreed, two neither agreed nor disagreed, and the remaining participants disagreed (two) or strongly disagreed (one) (Figure 5).

Similar to hostage participants, one of the main concerns wrongful detainee participants shared involved classification issues. Participants shared that they were constantly being told, "we can't talk about that," "you don鈥檛 have a clearance," and "that鈥檚 classified." Some participants, in an attempt to find someone within the U.S. government who would share information, established relationships with Congressional staffers. 鈥淓ven with Congress,鈥 one participant shared 鈥渨e'll ask what the State Department is saying, and they'll say, 鈥榥ot much.鈥 When the State Department does share information with Congress and we ask what was said, we get the same response as from State. 鈥業t鈥檚 classified.鈥欌 鈥淲hat do we need to do to get past what is classified,鈥 one participant asked in exasperation, 鈥渂ecause we need to know more!鈥 Others shared, 鈥渨e get a little bit [of information] here and there, but mostly it鈥檚 us giving [the government] information.鈥

Another frustration raised by wrongful detainee participants involved a lack of interagency coordination and information sharing. 鈥淚 have to be the one going from department to department, agency to agency, to share information, not only for my [loved one], but for the efforts of other departments and agencies as well,鈥 shared one wrongful detainee participant. 鈥淚f we don鈥檛 push for information, it鈥檚 not happening,鈥 another wrongful detainee participant said.

Overall, wrongful detainee participants showed a level of fatigue from repeated disappointments with government information sharing about their loved one鈥檚 case. One wrongful detainee participant commented with frustration, 鈥渨e鈥檙e not getting enough information whatsoever!鈥 Another participant shared, 鈥渨e have more to tell them then they have to tell us. That鈥檚 what the phone calls are for; not to give us information, but for them to get their information through us.鈥 Some participants expressed doubts that the Department of State has any information, leading them to question whether the government is working on their loved one鈥檚 case at all. Additionally, participants are getting tired of hearing that they have 鈥済ood ideas,鈥 but that government officials are 鈥済oing to see what happens.鈥 Participants also expressed frustration that they did not receive updates about their loved ones鈥 cases. Instead, participants shared that they were told not to worry if they didn鈥檛 鈥渟ee anything in the media, or if it鈥檚 not public, or if you don鈥檛 hear about it, or if we don鈥檛 tell you about it, that doesn鈥檛 mean that it鈥檚 not happening.鈥 鈥淚t鈥檚 become normal,鈥 one participant shared, 鈥測ou get used to the response. It is what it is.鈥

Recovery Efforts Shared with Hostage and Wrongful Detainee Participants

A significant part of the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage review in 2015 and the subsequent changes directed by EO 13698鈥檚 restructuring of the government鈥檚 hostage enterprise was an attempt to sync up what President Obama described as 鈥渟incere, relentless efforts within the government鈥 with hostage families. This, he believed, was an important step in ensuring hostage families, were treated as partners in the effort to recover their loved ones.7 This partnership is important to the families of hostages and wrongful detainees who have the most to lose from the continued captivity of their loved ones or from the consequences of a failed military rescue.

In the interviews with the 2019 and 2020 participants, JWFLF asked questions about the level of information sharing regarding recovery efforts.8 In the 2019 report, pre-PPD-30 participants generally disagreed that the U.S. government shared information regarding hostage recovery plans while post PPD-30 participants generally agreed that they did. In the interviews conducted for the 2020 report, hostage responses are mixed, while wrongful detainee responses are overwhelmingly negative (Figure 6). Hostage and wrongful detainee participants were most concerned with the U.S. government鈥檚 ability to recover their loved one and its openness in sharing candid assessment of recovery efforts.

Hostage Participant Responses

JWFLF asked its participants if the U.S. government shared candid recovery assessments for their loved ones. Of the five responses, two participants strongly agreed (one) or agreed (one), two neither agreed nor disagreed, and the remaining respondent disagreed (Figure 6).

While 2020 hostage responses were similar to 2019 post-PPD-30 responses, showing improvement in the provision of candid assessments regarding sharing recovery options after the implementation of PPD-30, there still remains concern over coordination between the HRFC and the Department of Defense.9

Some participants shared their concerns that the Department of Defense was withholding information from the HRFC and acting unilaterally without notifying the HRFC about details and the current status of their case. One participant expressed their 鈥渄eep concern鈥 about the risk that these unilateral operations might have on hostages broadly. Some participants argued that the HRFC鈥檚 standing within the U.S. government should be increased in order to prevent the Department of Defense from bypassing the HRFC.10

In addition to coordination of all the departments and agencies working towards the release of a hostage, bold leadership, lack of intelligence, and honesty and transparency were issues raised by participants. Participants shared their view on leadership attributes that they view as critically important to ensuring that their loved ones are released. They were particularly concerned that U.S. officials should have strong leadership skills that could affect change by influencing and engaging with top U.S. officials, as well as liaise and engage with multiple departments and agencies. From the participants鈥 perspective, the personality of the leadership in organizations working towards the release of their loved ones had a non-trivial impact on the safe return of their loved ones.

In addition, several participants indicated that they would like more transparency from the U.S. government regarding what the government can and cannot do to secure their loved one鈥檚 return. Participants also wanted more honesty about what the government is willing to do to bring their loved one home and what the government is unwilling to do. Other participants were less optimistic about the U.S. government鈥檚 ability to bring their loved ones home, citing minimal intelligence and influence in the areas where their loved ones are held.

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

When asked whether the U.S. government shared candid recovery assessments for their loved ones, the responses of wrongful detainee participants in the 2020 report mirrored those of pre-PPD-30 participants in the 2019 report.11 The majority (seven of nine) of wrongful detainee respondents strongly disagreed that the U.S. government shared information with them regarding recovery plans and strategies for their loved ones. Two participants neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 6).

The interviews underscored the difficulty of securing the release of wrongful detainees, especially in cases where the foreign governments holding American nationals consider them leverage over the U.S. government. This is increasingly difficult when there are negative relationships between that government and the United States, a commonality in most wrongful detainee cases. These dynamics make the role of diplomacy an important part of recovery strategies for wrongful detainees. In addition, participants highlighted the importance of the SPEHA鈥檚 role in working with third party countries to influence foreign governments to release U.S. nationals.

Other families shared their frustration over not receiving any type of recovery plans or options to help bring their loved ones home. One participant shared, 鈥渨e are not given any sort of sense where [loved one鈥檚 case] is within our government. I don鈥檛 know of any efforts in process.鈥

Often, adversarial governments willing to hold Americans as leverage will be holding more than one U.S. national. Wrongful detainee participants also shared their concerns about securing the release of their loved ones in these situations. Participants expressed their desire to know if the government had a coordinated plan to secure the release of all Americans held by the foreign government. Several wrongful detainee participants shared their confusion about what the release of a U.S. national meant for their loved one. One wrongful detainee shared, 鈥淒oes one release indicate [the foreign government] is willing to continue negotiating or does it mean we missed our chance to get our loved one out? We don鈥檛 know.鈥 Participants expressed concerns that the U.S. government鈥檚 departments and agencies may not be coordinated in their approach and that actions by one part of the government to secure the release of a wrongfully detained American might have an adverse impact on their loved ones.

Overall, bold leadership, intelligence, coordination, and communication between U.S. government departments and agencies, government response (diplomacy and military action), and third-party country and intermediary interactions were identified as important components required to recover an American held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.

Prioritization of Hostage and Wrongful Detainee Cases

In JWFLF鈥檚 initial 2019 assessment of the efficacy of PPD-30鈥檚 implementation, the discussion of whether families of hostages and detainees felt as though the U.S. government considered their loved one鈥檚 case a priority was one of the most polarizing issues. Family members of hostages and detainees who interacted with the U.S. government prior to the implementation of PPD-30 often disagreed in the strongest possible terms that their loved one鈥檚 case was a priority for the U.S. government. Those family members who interacted with the U.S. government after the implementation of PPD-30 tended to agree that the U.S. government considered their loved one鈥檚 case a priority.12 In this year鈥檚 report, hostage participants generally agreed that the U.S. government considers their case a priority. The families of wrongful detainees, on the other hand, when asked about their perspective of whether the U.S. government considered their loved one鈥檚 case a priority had negative responses similar to those of the families of hostages prior to the implementation of PPD-30.

Hostage Participant Responses

The majority (five of seven) of hostage participants said that they agreed (three) or strongly agreed (two) that their loved one was a priority of the U.S. government. One respondent neither agreed or disagreed and the other respondent disagreed with the statement that they believed their loved one鈥檚 cases were a priority of the U.S. government (Figure 7).

One of the main issues hostage families raised was their concern that the HRFC and SPEHA鈥檚 office do not have enough authority to push their loved one鈥檚 case to the priority level they think is required to achieve a resolution of their case.13 Families understand that the release of their loved ones is in competition with other national security concerns. Their request, however, is that their loved one鈥檚 case be 鈥渙ne of the top priorities.鈥 One family member commented, 鈥渋f they don鈥檛 have a seat at the table [National Security Council Deputies Committee], it鈥檚 a lot harder to have hostage issues as a top priority.鈥 Several participants responded favorably to the former SPEHA, Robert O鈥橞rien, becoming the national security advisor. From their perspective, this potentially raises the priority level of their loved one鈥檚 case. One hostage family member who developed a good relationship with O鈥橞rien responded, 鈥渉aving someone working at a higher level on our behalf raises the priority of my [loved one鈥檚] case.鈥

Hostage families also raised concerns about the vacancy in the SPEHA position at the Department of State created by O鈥橞rien鈥檚 assumption of the national security advisor position.14 Overall, families viewed the vacancy as an indicator that hostage issues were not a top priority of the administration. Working with an acting SPEHA resulted in fewer attempts to coordinate diplomatic efforts overseas in addition to personnel gaps within the SPEHA鈥檚 office that limited the ability of the office to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the SPEHA.

Additionally, families expressed their desire to see more action and follow through from the government based on the discussions and plans presented to them during meetings and briefings with the HRFC and SPEHA鈥檚 office.

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

The majority (seven of eleven) of wrongful detainee participants strongly disagreed (four) or disagreed (three), that their loved ones were a priority of the U.S. government. An additional three other participants neither agreed nor disagreed and only one family member agreed that that their case was a priority of the U.S. government, stating, 鈥渕y case only became a priority after receiving Congressional attention鈥 (Figure 7).

Wrongful detainee families responded similarly to hostage families in expressing a desire for engagement at higher levels of government. One wrongful detainee participant shared that by not having 鈥渢he highest levels of government鈥 highlighting their case, 鈥渟hows the lack of priority the U.S. government places on us.鈥 Another participant shared that 鈥渋t would show [our loved one鈥檚 case] is a priority if the president, secretary of state, or national security advisor would publicly address their case.鈥

Several wrongful detainee participants expressed their frustration with the Department of State over having to go to numerous meetings without learning anything noteworthy about their case. One participant shared that such meetings 鈥渟how that they don鈥檛 take the case seriously and [it] is not a priority of the U.S. government. They were asking about the place my [loved one] was held. They knew nothing about the case. New people come in and have no idea about the case, asking me what I can tell them about my [loved one鈥檚] case. To not know, really breaks your heart. That鈥檚 why I get the sense that we鈥檙e not a priority.鈥

Other participants stressed the difficulty of getting the Department of State to make their case a priority. Some participants recognized that the priority level of their case was dependent on their ability to advocate for their loved one. These participants recognized the importance of having legal support or a human rights advocate in the Washington, D.C. area to be able to help increase the priority level of their loved one鈥檚 case. One family member shared that 鈥渋t鈥檚 beneficial to be able to interact with decision makers, people who set the policies, and people who can set into motion the recovery of your loved one.鈥

Overall, wrongful detainee participants are desperate to get their loved ones out and want their cases to be a high priority of the U.S. government. One family member stated, 鈥淚 want [my loved one] to be a priority, because if they stay in there any longer, they鈥檙e not going to make it! … All they [the U.S. government] say is that all hostages and detainees are a priority. I want them to say that my [loved one] is a priority!鈥

Understanding of Laws and Policy

The reforms enacted by EO 13698 and PPD-30 were designed to improve the government鈥檚 effectiveness in bringing home American hostages and to help clarify the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage policy. A key theme in JWFLF鈥檚 2019 assessment of PPD-30鈥檚 implementation was a lack of clarity of the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage policy prior to PPD-30. After PPD-30, family members indicated they had more clarity about the U.S. government鈥檚 hostage policy, but lacked clarity on other issues, specifically the issue of whether family members and their intermediaries could be prosecuted for the payment of ransoms.15 JWFLF again asked its participants during interviews for this report about their understanding of these laws and policies. The resultant discussions, below, demonstrate a continued lack of clarity about issues surrounding ransom amongst hostage families. Wrongful detainee families again shared narratives consistent with pre-PPD-30 hostage families, signaling confusion about the U.S. government鈥檚 policies surrounding wrongful detainee cases.

Hostage Participant Responses

Hostage participants generally understood U.S. hostage policy, although some who have had less experience working with the government expressed confusion about all the nuances and provisions of PPD-30. The biggest area of confusion for hostage participants, as in the 2019 report, centered around the U.S. government鈥檚 stance on the private payment of ransoms to secure the release of their loved ones.

The payment of a ransom to secure the release of a hostage can technically be considered a provision of 鈥渕aterial support鈥 to a designated terrorist organization, conduct which is criminalized under U.S. criminal code.16 Prior to the implementation of PPD-30, some hostage families were threatened with prosecution if they paid a ransom to secure the release of their loved one. After the 2015 Hostage Policy Review, the U.S. government reaffirmed its stance against providing concessions, including the payment of ransoms, to terrorist groups. At the same time, the Department of Justice released a statement highlighting the fact that no families of hostages had ever been prosecuted for paying a ransom to secure the release of their loved one.17

Hostage participants expressed concerns that, despite the Department of Justice鈥檚 statement, 鈥渘othing is in writing. It can change instantly.鈥 Hostage participants also expressed confusion about how far the freedom from prosecution would extend. 鈥淚f I were to pay a ransom,鈥 said one hostage participant, 鈥淚 couldn鈥檛 go pay it myself, I鈥檇 have to send a negotiator. Would they be exempted from prosecution as well?鈥 Other hostage participants expressed similar concerns, asking whether banks and/or financial donors would be safe from prosecution as well.

The U.S. government likely has legitimate reasons for this public lack of clarity. If it is clear that the U.S. government supports the payment of private ransoms, terrorist groups could be better positioned to pressure families to pay ransoms. At the same time, the government is not adequately explaining the nuances of its position to hostage participants behind the scenes, which would allow them to be able to make informed decisions on how to best secure their loved one鈥檚 release.

Wrongful Detainee Participant Responses

Unfortunately, wrongful detainee families identified difficulties understanding laws and policies regarding their cases. One participant said, 鈥淚 have no idea what the current policy is. I didn't know there was one until you just mentioned that.鈥 Another participant expressed frustration over still not having a clear definition of what makes one individual a hostage and another a wrongful detainee. One more wrongful detainee participant discussed their frustration trying to get a clear definition of what made a detention wrongful, triggering access to the SPEHA鈥檚 office. Aside from a lack of clarity over the definitional differences between hostages, detainees, and wrongful detainees, wrongful detainee participants also shared a lack of clarity on what the SPEHA鈥檚 office was legally allowed to do to support their loved one鈥檚 case. The SPEHA鈥檚 diplomatic role was clear, but according to one wrongful detainee participant, it was unclear what the SPEHA鈥檚 office was legally authorized to do. 鈥淲hat are their legal obligations,鈥 the participant asked, continuing, 鈥淲hat tools do they have? How are they best supposed to support wrongful detainees?鈥

These experiences were very similar to those pre-PPD-30 hostage families shared in the 2019 report.18 This lack of clarity is a major stressor for the families of wrongful detainees, increasing frustration during an already extraordinarily challenging experience. Participants have consistently shared a desire to be told the truth, even if that truth is difficult. For these participants, having a consistent definition of a wrongful detention case, even if that means their loved one is not considered one, at least helps them understand how to best move forward advocating for the release of their loved one. In addition, having clarity on what the SPEHA鈥檚 office can achieve helps them know when they need to find support outside of the U.S. government.

Citations
  1. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement.鈥
  2. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 74鈥76.
  3. See the third section of this report on key concerns among hostage and detainee families for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
  4. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 44.
  5. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 47.
  6. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 32鈥34.
  7. 鈥淪tatement by the President on the U.S. Government鈥檚 Hostage Policy Review鈥 (White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 24, 2015),
  8. This discussion uses the term 鈥渞ecovery efforts鈥 to mean all options to secure the release of U.S. nationals held hostage or wrongfully detained, including: diplomatic engagement to facilitate releases; coercive diplomatic efforts, like sanctions to pressure foreign governments; negotiations facilitated by third parties; and military efforts. like hostage rescue operations.
  9. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 32, 42.
  10. See the third section of this report on key concerns among hostage and detainee families for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
  11. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 33鈥43.
  12. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 37.
  13. See the third section of this report on key concerns among hostage and detainee families for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
  14. See the third section of this report on key concerns among hostage and detainee families for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
  15. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 26鈥30.
  16. Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 18 U.S.C. 搂 2339B (2016).
  17. 鈥淒epartment of Justice Statement on U.S. Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad鈥 Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, June 24, 2015),
  18. Loertscher, 鈥淏ringing Americans Home: The First Non-Governmental Assessment of U.S. Hostage Policy and Family Engagement,鈥 26鈥27.
2. Perceptions of the U.S. Government鈥檚 Hostage Recovery Enterprise

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