We Want a More Private Internet, But We Want to Screenshot It, Too
This article in , a collaboration among , , and .
What goes on the internet stays on the internet. Anything you say publicly鈥攐n a blog, in a Facebook post, in a tweet鈥攃ould be shared far beyond the audience you imagined, and that鈥檚 wreaked havoc on countless occasions: Scores of celebrities have come under fire for their . It can destroy careers for noncelebrities too, like Justine Sacco, who was famously fired after her insensitive tweet .
It鈥檚 no wonder, then, that people have moved toward smaller, more intimate online communities where conversations aren鈥檛 as public. 鈥淧eople are more cautious of having a permanent record of what they鈥檝e shared,鈥 Mark Zuckerberg wrote in a announcing the platform鈥檚 shift toward prioritizing closed groups and other private communications. Twitter, too, is introducing ways for users to . These more private spaces often require a special invitation, curated by moderators, and posts made in them can鈥檛 be viewed by or shared to people outside the circle. In addition, many groups enforce privacy through norms and etiquette: Like the rules of Fight Club, members shouldn鈥檛 talk about the group with nonmembers, and most definitely should not share things from this group with anyone outside of it. Text messages abide by similar rules. I cherish the implicit trust that should our conversation about my 鈥渨hich March sister are you鈥 quiz results turn toward more private topics, those words won鈥檛 leave my screen or my friends鈥. But one thing challenges all of that: screenshots.
Sharing screenshots has become a normal part of our digital behavior.
Screenshots reflect the itch to document a moment that evoked emotion: amusement, incredulity, anger (or maybe all three). Scrolling through my own phone, I see screenshots of Instagram comments that made me laugh, a threatening email from an irate reader, and a weird post from my neighborhood group about an aggressive crow. Each of those came from a closed or private online space, but I wanted to make sure I had some record of them just in case. Some screenshots have never left my phone and are only for me, while I鈥檝e sent others (usually the funny ones) to friends I think would enjoy them.
Sharing screenshots has become a normal part of our digital behavior. Once-private or semi-private messages make the rounds online, entertaining us and stirring up drama. When someone makes a claim and insists they , they鈥檙e often screenshots鈥攁 series of Instagram DMs, text messages, private social media posts. There are entire online subcommunities dedicated to private drama made public via screenshots; Facebook groups like 鈥渋 am but a simple moth to a dumpster fire鈥 and 鈥溾 or subreddits like are built on screenshots of silly exchanges and ridiculous arguments.
The popularity of shared screenshots is a reflection of our slowly eroding private sphere. Try as we might to maintain privacy in personal communications, what the recipients of our data and messages do with our information is largely out of our hands. Take, for instance, Facebook鈥檚 Cambridge Analytica scandal: It revealed that users who allowed the This Is My Digital Life app to their data compromised not only their own data, but . (Apps like did the same, allowing third-party companies to harvest a huge amount of user data.) On a smaller scale, sharing with someone鈥攅ven someone you trust鈥攃an backfire spectacularly; an revealed that Jeff Bezos鈥 texts and photos with girlfriend Lauren Sanchez were compromised by Sanchez herself, when she shared screenshots with her brother.
And now, screenshots might become fodder for researchers. In January, Stanford scientists announced a new endeavor called the Human Screenome Project, which takes screenshots of participants鈥 phone use every five seconds. The idea is that the screenshots will provide a more nuanced look at 鈥渟creen time鈥 and the myriad ways we use our phones. On the project鈥檚 , a clip shows screenshots representing three minutes of a user鈥檚 activity, which includes Google searches, Spotify playlists, scrolling through Instagram, and texts between friends. The researchers say this data will be . Technically, as long as participants consent to their data being recorded, standard research ethics wouldn鈥檛 require researchers to do much else to protect users鈥 privacy. But required research ethics scratch only the surface of what is morally right. (Another example: It鈥檚 not technically a violation of ethics to use data from 鈥減ublic鈥 sources like YouTube videos or tweets, but people who in research are often put off by it.) And it鈥檚 not only study participants鈥 data that will be collected鈥攁nyone they text or message with can have their words screenshotted too. If I were a close friend or family member of someone participating in this project, I鈥檇 want to know if my private conversations were being archived somewhere and potentially viewable by researchers.
Unfortunately, there鈥檚 no script for telling your friends and family that you鈥檝e shared their info with an app, or that you鈥檙e allowing researchers to access your data. Until we develop social norms for this type of situation, there鈥檚 one feature that could help: screenshot notifications. At the very least, it鈥檚 high time to think about the screenshot as a privacy liability and consider limiting its power, through app settings and social acceptability.
This is already a regular feature in some apps. Snapchat gained popularity for the ephemerality of its posts鈥攕tories stay up for 24 hours, and photos sent directly to another user disappear as soon as the recipient has seen them. To protect that sense of privacy, the app users if someone has taken a screenshot of their content. Instagram users if someone took a screenshot of a photo they sent directly to another user, but that鈥檚 no longer a feature.
If this were standard practice across platforms鈥攐n, say, Facebook, WhatsApp, Tinder, and smartphones鈥 native texting apps鈥攑eople might think twice about taking screenshots without permission. The motivation isn鈥檛 always nefarious. I have a folder on my phone of screenshots of funny or heartwarming conversations I want to save for later. But I have also taken and received my fair share of screenshots where I suspect the original poster would be a little upset to learn their content or conversations didn鈥檛 stay private: strangers鈥 terrible dating profiles, annoying posts in neighborhood Facebook groups, text exchanges a friend wants help deciphering. An alert can鈥檛 prevent people from taking screenshots and sharing them, but it could deter them. It could also encourage more dialogue between users about data sharing; a notification that says 鈥淪o-and-so took a screenshot of your photo鈥 can open up a conversation about what they intend to do with that snap, or allow a user to just block someone who consistently creeps on their posts.
Snap says its users have 鈥渃ome to expect鈥 that screenshot notification. 鈥淲e鈥檝e gotten feedback from users that they really love that feature,鈥 says Katherine Tassi, Snap鈥檚 deputy general counsel for privacy. 鈥淚t鈥檚 really a contract between users, who know if they take a screenshot, the other individual is going to get notified.鈥
Snap鈥檚 screenshot alert shows that the absence of such a feature on other apps isn鈥檛 a matter of technical difficulty. It鈥檚 not complicated for apps to build such a feature into their platforms, at least on mobile devices. Apple includes in its Software Development Kit for iOS that developers can use to identify when a screenshot is taken, so simple detection is 鈥渢rivial,鈥 says app developer Kevin Donnelly. The next steps鈥攔eporting the screenshot to the app鈥檚 server and then sending a notification to the affected user鈥攕hould be fairly straightforward as well. A screenshot alert might be more difficult to execute on Android apps, says Donnelly, because of how flexible the operating system is, but in lieu of screenshot notifications, developers might be able to block screenshots altogether. Similar code could also block screen recording on phone operating systems, another popular way to capture on-screen content. If screenshots generated notifications, screen recording might become a more popular workaround, so it seems wise to anticipate how to control recording as well.
To make this all work, apps would need to encode data in a way that allows for easy identification of whose content is being screenshotted. On Snapchat, for instance, photos display after you click on a user story or open a message, so the app should easily detect exactly whose content a user is looking at. Scrolling through a feed is more complicated. As you read through Facebook鈥檚 newsfeed, you see a hodgepodge of posts from friends, individuals posting in groups, or ads. That makes things 鈥渉arder, but not very hard,鈥 says Donnelly. 鈥淵ou can fairly easily get an idea of what components are on the screen at the time of the screenshot and look at the underlying structured data to identify which users鈥 content is being displayed.鈥 As long as developers are structuring their data properly to leave a 鈥減aper trail鈥 of what users are looking at when they take a screenshot, notifications are certainly possible.
While notifications or screenshot blocking might be a deterrent, they鈥檙e obviously not foolproof. Introducing these features might deter the casual screenshotter, but the truly motivated can always find ways around them. The more tech-savvy could write code to get around anti鈥搒creen capture features, but there鈥檚 also an easy, low-tech workaround: Just take a photo of a screen with another screen. Snap says it鈥檚 aware that people try to get around the app鈥檚 screenshot notification feature (even publications like have run guides on how to screenshot in secret) and remains vigilant about those strategies so they can fix any potential loopholes users discover. On Android, in particular, the customizability of the operating system means that motivated individuals can get around app code. 鈥淪omeone with enough time might be able to configure their phone in a way to get around any system the developer implemented,鈥 says Donnelly. And there may be cases where we 诲辞苍鈥檛 want to block surreptitious screenshots; it鈥檚 a good thing when someone can secretly screenshot evidence to hold a serial harasser or abusive partner accountable, or 鈥渞eceipts鈥 to trace . The real solution lies beyond code: We need the norms and language to deter malicious screenshots. But in the meantime, alerts could help.